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Case No. 20140295 & 20140296-CA 
INTHE 
UT AH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
V. 
ALLEN BRUNN & JAMES DIDERICKSON, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendants Allan Bruun and James Diderickson appeal convictions 
for twelve counts of theft (six second degree felonies, five third degree 
felonies, and one class A misdemeanor), and one count of engaging in a 
pattern of unlawful activity (a second degree felony). This Court has 
jurisdiction under Utah Code Annotated § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West Supp. 
2012). 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendants were majority shareholders in Tivoli Properties, an LLC 
that was formed to develop 29 acres of land in Saratoga Springs. Several 
months after Tivoli was fanned, its other shareholders learned that 
Defendants had written checks for aln1ost $200,000 out of Tivoli funds and 
used those funds to support their other companies and projects. A jury later 
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convicted Defendants of twelve counts of theft and one count of engaging in 
a pattern of unlawful activity. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Issue I: Did the Utah LLC Act allow Defendants to unilaterally 
disregard limitations on their spending authority that were set forth in 
Tivoli' s Operating Agreement? 
Issue II: Did the court err by allowing the jury to determine whether 
Defendants were authorized to write the checks? 
Issue III: Did the court err by refusing to reduce the value of each theft 
conviction by the amount of Defendants' alleged ownership interest in 
Tivoli? 
Standard of Review for Issues I-III: These statutory interpretation 
questions are reviewed for correch1ess. State v. Binkerd, 2013 UT App 216, 
if 21, 310 P.3d 755. 
Issue IV: Did Defendants receive ineffective assistance when their trial 
counsel withdrew a request for a lesser included offense insh·uction on 
wrongful appropriation? 
Issue V: Did Defendants receive ineffective assistance when their 
counsel did not request an additional jury instruction to define one of the 
elements of a pattern of unlawful conduct? 
-2-
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Standard of Review for Issues IV-V: Ineffective assistance claims raised 
for the first time on appeal are reviewed for correctness. State v. Bryant, 
2012 UT App 264, ,IlO, 290 P.3d 33. 
Issue VI: Did the court err by not reducing the restitution order based 
on the value the victims received in a prior civil settlement? 
Standard of Review: This statutory interpretation question is reviewed 
for correctness. Binkerd, 2013 UT App 216, ,r21. 
Issue VII: Should this Court reverse for cumulative error? 
Standard of Review: This Court reverses for cumulative error II only if 
the cumulative effect of the several errors" undermines confidence that a 
"fair trial was had." State v. Santonio, 2011 UT App 385, ,J30, 265 P.3d 822. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following are reproduced in Addendum A: 
• Utah Code Ann.§ 76-6-404 (West 2009); 
• Utah Code Ann.§ 48-2c-803-804 (West 2009); 
e, Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-701 (West 2009). 
-3-
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE1 
Tivoli LLC is formed to develop 29 acres in Saratoga Springs 
In 1989, Kerry and Bobbie Posey bought 42 acres of land in Saratoga 
Springs. R1554:114. They sold off 13 acres over the years, but kept the 
remaining 29 acres, hoping to eventually sell them at a high enough price to 
fund their retirements. R1521:128-29, 141; 1554:114-15. 
In early 2007, the Poseys were introduced to Defendants, who worked 
together developing real estate projects. R1521:131-32, 136. In August 2007, 
the Poseys and Defendants worked out a two-step deal by which they 
would jointly develop the Poseys' 29 acres. First, the Poseys agreed to sell 
the 29 acres to Equity Partners ("Equity"), an LLC that was owned by 
Defendants. R1521:139; 1554:128; 1535:213-14; see also State's Exh. 1 (Real 
Estate Purchase Contract) ("the REPC") (Addendum B). Second, the Poseys 
and Defendants formed Tivoli Properties, an LLC that was created to 
develop the 29 acres. R1521:140; see also State's Exh. 2 ("the Operating 
Agreement" or "Op.Agr.") (Addendum C). 
1 The facts are recited in the light 1nost favorable to the jury's verdict. 
State v. Bravo, 2015 UT App 17, ,12 n.1, 343 P.3d 306. 
Defendants were tried together. To avoid duplication, the State will 
cite to Diderickson' s h·ial record. Also, Defendants filed separate briefs that 
are paginated slightly differently. But their briefs are substantively identical, 
raising the same argmnents and issues in the same order and relying on the 
same authority. To avoid duplication, the State will respond to the 
pagination fron1 Diderickson' s brief and cite to it as" Aplt. Br." 
-4- r:::, 
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Under the Operating Agreement, Equity initially owned 75% of the 
shares in Tivoli, while the Poseys owned 25%. Op.Agr. at 3.3. The 
understanding was that the Poseys were putting up the property, while 
Defendants would use their expertise to develop it. R1521:156. 
The initial question was how to fund the development. The answer 
came in the form of another transaction. In the original REPC, Equity 
agreed to pay $3.5 million to the Poseys for the property, including $750,000 
up front. REPC at *1; R1521:141-42. But when Defendants told the Poseys 
that they couldn't come up with the money, the Poseys agreed that 
Defendants would put the property up for a collateral loan and allow its 
proceeds to be used to fund Tivoli' s initial development. R1521:142-43. 
On Nove1nber 16, 2007, Defendants secured a short-term, high-
interest loan for $750,000 from K.E. Capital. R1521:143 147, 195; REPC, add. 
5 at line 202. That loan was secured using the 29 acres as collateral. 
R1534:20. 
Approximately $350,000 was used to pay off pre-existing mortgages 
and taxes; the remaining money was put into Tivoli' s bank account. 
R1520:47; 1534:16; 1554:145; REPC, Add. 5 at lines 506-08. This money was 
Tivoli's only money. R1534:131, 313-14; 1554:154. It was "exclusively" 
~ intended to get Tivoli through the "entitlement" process- the process by 
-5-
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which a municipality approves a future development. R1521:144, 147; 
1534:69-70. The idea was that after entitlement was completed, Tivoli would 
be able to secure a consh·uction loan at better terms allowing it to actually 
build on the property. R1521:147. Defendants told the Poseys that 
entitlement would cost "around a hundred thousand dollars." R1554:139; 
1521:153-54. 
Poseys discover that Defendants used 
Tivoli' s money for their own purposes 
The Poseys also worked out an arrangement with Defendants m 
which they received weekly distributions from Tivoli' s funds. R1554:148-
49; REPC, Add. 4. In May 2008, however, Diderickson told the Poseys that 
there was not enough money left in the Tivoli account to pay the 
distributions. R1554:165-66. When Bobbie asked where the 1noney had 
gone, Diderickson "evaded" her question. R1554:166; 1521:167-68. 
Concerned, the Poseys accessed Tivoli' s bank account and discovered 
that it was down to just $1083. R1554:167-68. When they reviewed the 
check history, they were "floored" to learn that Defendants had spent 
several hundred thousand dollars on expenses that appeared unrelated to 
the development of the 29 acres. R1554:169, 171; 1521:168. These included a 
number of checks that Defendants had written to themselves or their other 
cmnpanies- including one for $100,000 - as well checks that covered 
-6-
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expenses on Defendants' other real estate projects. See R69-78 (listing 
checks); State's Exh. 4 (copies of each check) (Addendum D) 
Civil settlement 
In the meantime, payment on the K.E. Capital loan was coming due, 
creating the risk that K.E. Capital would foreclose on the property. 
R1521 :249-50. The risk of foreclosure was so imminent that Diderickson 
asked the Poseys to sign off on another $100,000 loan that would buy Tivoli 
an extra two weeks. R1521:181-82. Bobbie refused to sign. R1521:183-87. 
Instead, she filed a notice of default, intending to get title to the property 
back from Equity so that the Poseys could negotiate with K.E. Capital 
directly. R1554:178; 1521:250. 
On November 11, 2008, the Poseys entered a settlement agreement 
with Equity. Defendants' Exh. 2 ("the civil settlement") (Addendum E). 
Under its terms, the Poseys paid $25,000 to Equity in exchange for title to 
the 29 acres. Id. at *1-2. The Poseys also agreed to release Defendants from 
all claims relating to their manage1nent of Tivoli. Id. at ~-2. 
Defendants are ordered to pay restitution 
On May 9, 2011, Defendants were charged with 29 criminal counts. 
Rl-12; see also R69-78 (amended information). 
-7-
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Theft: Counts 1-28 were theft charges. Under Utah Code Annotated 
§ 76-6-404 (West 2009), a "person commits theft if he obtains or exercises 
unauthorized control over the property of another with a purpose to 
deprive him thereof." Each of the theft counts was tied to a check that the 
State alleged Defendants wrote from Tivoli' s account for an unauthorized 
purpose. R69-78. 
UPUAA: Count 29 charged Defendants with violating the Utah 
Pattern of Unlawful Activities Act (UPUAA) by committing at least three 
thefts. R69-78. 
Defendants were h·ied from November 4-15, 2013. Midway through 
h·ial, the State dismissed two of the theft counts. R1536:207-08. 
As for the remaining counts, Defendants never disputed that they 
wrote the checks or that the funds came fr01n Tivoli's account. Instead, 
Defendants claimed that they were authorized to write these checks under · 
both the Operating Agreement and the parties' course of dealings. See 
R1554:92-93, 96-111; 1535:265-71; 1538:36-53, 63-93. 
The jury convicted Defendants of twelve theft counts and the UPUAA 
count, but it acquitted Defendants of the remaining theft counts. R967-70. 
By virtue of the convictions, the jury found that Defendants c01nmitted theft 
by using Tivoli funds without authorization for: 
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• Expenses associated with Defendants' other real estate development 
projects (counts 2, 3, 4, 15, 19, 24); and 
• Cash advances to Defendants' other companies (counts 5, 7, 8, 21, 22, 
and 28). 
R69-78; 967-70. 
At sentencing, the court ordered Defendants to serve a year in jail and 
pay restitution. R1099-1102. Defendants subsequently moved to vacate or 
modify the restitution order, arguing that (1) restitution was foreclosed by 
the civil settlement, and (2) that if restitution was ordered, it should be 
reduced to reflect the Poseys' limited ownership interest in Tivoli. R1071-
79, 1348-53. 
The court rejected these arguments and ordered Defendants to pay 
$189,574 in restitution- an amount equal to the face value of the twelve 
checks for which Defendants were convicted. R1373-75; 1539:22-25. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I: Defendants argue that because they owned 75% of Tivoli, the 
Utah LLC Act gave them authority to unilaterally disregard any limitations 
on their spending authority set forth in the Operating Agree1nent. This 
claim is unpreserved, so Defendants allege plain error and ineffective 
assistance of counsel. 
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Both clahns fail for the sa1ne reason-namely, the LLC Act did not 
allow Defendants to disregard Tivoli' s Operating Agreement. Instead, the 
very provisions in the LLC Act that Defendants rely on state that any 
limitations imposed in an operating agreement conh·ol. Here, the Operating 
Agreement expressly limited Defendants' spending authority. Because of 
this, the LLC Act provided no basis for relief. 
Point II: Defendants argue that the court erred by allowing the jury 
to determine whether they were authorized to write the checks. According 
to Defendants, the court should have decided the question as a matter of 
law. 
The court did not err. It is settled that if a contract's terms are 
ambiguous, its interpretation becomes a question of fact. Here, the 
Operating Agreement was ambiguous as to (i) Tivoli' s business purpose, (ii) 
whether Defendants were Tivoli' s managers, and (iii) whether Defendants 
had authority to write these checks. Because of the ambiguity, the court 
properly sub1nitted the case to the jury. 
If the court erred, the error was harmless because the jury decided the 
question correctly. The Operating Agreement contained several lhnitations 
that prohibited Defendants from writing these checks for these purposes. 
-10-
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Thus, even if the court should have decided the question as a matter of law, 
Defendants were not harmed because the jury's decision was correct. 
Point III: Defendants argue that the court should have reduced the 
value of each theft conviction by their ownership interest in Tivoli. 
Defendants then argue that if this had occurred, all but four of the 
convictions would have been barred by the statute of limitations. 
Contrary to their claim, Defendants had no personal ownership 
interest in Tivoli's money. Rather, they only had an ownership interest in 
Tivoli itself. Because of this, they were not authorized to take Tivoli' s 
money for their own use and they were properly convicted of theft for the 
full value of each check. 
Point IV: Defendants argue that their counsel was ineffective for 
withdrawing a request for a lesser included offense instruction on wrongful 
appropriation. 
Defendants have not proven deficient performance because counsel 
had a clear strategic reason for withdrawing the request- this advanced an 
"all or nothing approach" that was designed to maxhnize their prospects for 
acquittal. 
Defendants also have not proven prejudice. Defendants could only 
have been convicted of wrongful appropriation if the jury found that they 
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intended to temporarily steal Tivoli' s funds. But Defendants never claimed 
that they intended to temporarily steal Tivoli' s funds; rather, they claimed 
that they never stole any funds at all. Thus, there is not a reasonable 
probability that the outcome would have been different if the jury had been 
given this instruction. 
Point V: Defendants argue that their counsel was ineffective for not 
requesting an additional jury instruction that would have further defined 
one of the elements of the UPUAA charge. 
Counsel did not perform deficiently, however, because there was no 
settled law that entitled Defendants to the additional instruction. Moreover, 
counsel could have reasonably determined that requesting this instruction 
would open the door to potentially incriminatory information. 
Defendants also were not prejudiced. If counsel had requested and 
received this instruction, the insh·uction could only have ilnpacted one of 
the two variants by which the State could prove a UPUAA violation. But it 
would have left the other variant untouched, and the State had strong 
evidence to support conviction under that variant. Given this, it is not 
reasonably likely that the outcome would have been 1nore favorable if this 
insh·uction were given. 
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Point VI: Defendants argue that the court erred should have offset 
the restitution order to reflect the value they gave the Poseys in the civil 
settle1nent. Defendants never requested such an offset below, however, so 
the claim is unpreserved. Because Defendants do not invoke a preservation 
exception, the issue should not be reached. 
Point VII: Defendants ask for reversal for cumulative error. But 
because there was no prejudicial error, this request should be denied. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
The Utah LLC Act did not allow Defendants to disregard 
Tivoli' s Operating Agreement. 
The question at trial was whether Defendants were authorized to 
write the disputed checks. As discussed in more detail below, one of the 
cenh·al issues was whether limitations in the Operating Agreement meant 
that Defendants were not authorized to write these checks. 
On appeal, Defendants argue for the first tiine that they were not 
bound by the Operating Agreen1ent. According to Defendants, the Utah 
LLC Act gave them authority to unilaterally authorize these checks, even if 
the checks were in direct "conh·avention to the operating agreement." Aplt. 
Br. 23-25. 
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This claim is unpreserved, however, and no preservation exception 
applies because the Utah LLC Act did not grant Defendants this authority. 
A. This claim is unpreserved. 
"As a general rule, claims not raised before the district court may not 
be raised on appeal." Oseguera v. State, 2014 UT 31, ,110, 332 P.3d 963. To 
preserve a claim for appellate review, a litigant must present it "to the 
district court in such a way that the court has an opportunity to rule" on it. 
Id. A party does not do this "by merely mentioning an issue without 
analyzing supporting evidence or relevant legal authority." Id. 
"Additionally, a party that makes an objection based on one ground does 
not preserve any alternative grounds for objection for appeal." Id. 
Defendants admit that they "did not specifically request the court to 
interpret the LLC Act," but contend that this argument was "similar" to the 
their request for the court to conclude that they had authority under the 
Operating Agreement to write these checks. Aplt. Br. 2. 
But asking the court to interpret their rights under the Operating 
Agree1nent is a far cry fron1 asking the Court to determine that, by virtue of 
an unmentioned statute, Defendants could actually disregard the Operating 
Agree1nent entirely. Defendants did the fonner; they did not do the latter. 
-14-
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This claim is thus unpreserved and Defendants can obtain relief only 
if they demonstrate that a preservation exception applies. Oseguera, 2014 
UT 31, ~15. Here, Defendants argue that (1) the court plainly erred in not 
sua sponte recognizing their alleged rights under the LLC Act, and (2) trial 
counsel was ineffective for not invoking that act. Both claims fail. 
B. Defendants have not established that the court obviously 
erred by not ruling that they had authority to disregard the 
Operating Agreement. 
Defendants first assert that the court c01nmitted plain error by not sua 
sponte recognizing their alleged rights under the LLC Act. Aplt. Br. 34-35. 
To prove plain error, Defendants must prove "that the h·ial court committed 
an error, that the error was obvious, and that the error was prejudicial." 
State v. Sessions, 2014 UT 44, ~49, 342 P.3d 738. 
The proble1n with Defendants' argun1ent is that they had no such 
statutory right. Thus, there was no error, let alone plain error. 
Defendants first rely on Utah Code Annotated § 48-2c-804 (West 
2009), which governs 111anager-managed LLC's like Tivoli. Aplt. Br.23-25; 
see also Op.Agr. at 7.1-7.9 (suggesting that Tivoli was a manager-managed 
LLC). They specifically rely on § 48-2c-804(6), ,vhich states that "unless 
otherwise provided in the articles of organization or operating agreement of 
the company," members and n1anagers who hold "2/3 of the profits 
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interests in the company" can exercise the powers "described in Subsection 
48-2c-803(3)." Those powers include the power to make "a substantial 
change in the business purpose of the company." Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-
803(3)( d) (West 2009). 
Defendants contend that, because they owned two-thirds of the 
profits interest in Tivoli, it should have been obvious to the trial court that 
they had power to unilaterally change Tivoli's business purpose and 
unilaterally authorize these checks. Aplt. Br. 23-25. 
Defendants are misreading the LLC Act. Contrary to their claim, the 
LLC Act does not allow managers- even those holding two-thirds of the 
shares in an LLC- to disregard the opera ting agreement. Instead, the very 
statute Defendants rely on begins with the qualifier that the statutory 
authority exists "unless otherwise provided in the articles of organization or 
operating agreement of the company." Utah Code Ann.§ 48-2c-804(6). This 
limitation is cenh·al to the LLC Act, which contains a legislative directive to 
11 give the maximum effect" 11 to the enforceability of operating agreements of 
companies." Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-1901 (West 2009); accord OLP, LLC v. 
Burningham, 2008 UT App 173, i11s, 185 P.3d 1138 (LLC Act controls unless 
there is 11conh·ary language in [the] operating agreen1ent"). 
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Here, Defendants initially claim that they could unilaterally change 
Tivoli' s business purpose. But the Operating Agreement defined Tivoli' s 
business purpose. Op.Agr. at 2.4. And, notably, it then expressly required 
the "consent of One Hundred percent (100%) of all Membership Interests" 
for "[a]ny amendment or restatement" of "the Operating Agreement" or 
"[a]ny change in the character of the business and affairs of the Company." 
Op.Agr. at 7.5.5; 7.5.7. Thus, without the Poseys' consent, Defendants had 
no authority to change Tivoli' s business purpose. Notably, the Poseys 
testified at trial that they never gave such consent. R1554:142, 144, 163; 
1520:33-34; 1521:151, 162.2 
Defendants also rely on Utah Code Annotated § 48-2c-803(3)(a)(i), 
which allows members who hold two-thirds of the profits interest in an LLC 
to authorize a person "to do any act on behalf of the company that is not in 
the ordinary course of the company's business, or business of the kind 
2 As discussed below in Point II(B)(l ), if the Operating Agreement is 
read as a whole, it was arguably ambiguous as to the full scope of Tivoli' s 
business purpose. But this does not change the result with respect to 
Defendants' claim that they could unilaterally change that purpose. Again, 
the LLC Act expressly defers to any limitations in an operating agreement, 
and this Operating Agreen1ent stated that Tivoli's business purpose 
(whatever, exactly, it was) could not be changed without approval of 
members holding 100% of the men1bership interests. As noted, Defendants 
never received approval, and they accordingly had no such authority under 
the LLC Act. 
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carried on by the company." Aplt. Br. 24. They claim that, because of their 
ownership interest, this also gave them power to unilaterally authorize 
these checks. Id. 
But again, Utah Code Annotated § 48-2c-804(6) states that this power 
can be limited by an LLC's operating agreement. And here, the Operating 
Agreement requires approval of 100% of the membership interests for 
11 
[ a ]ny significant and material purchase" of II any real or personal property 
or business," as well as for the "commission of any act which would make it 
impossible for the Company to carry on its ordinary business and affairs." 
Op.Agr. at 7.5.1; 7.5.8. 
As discussed, Defendants were convicted of writing twelve 
unauthorized checks that, together, took $189,000 out of Tivoli's account. 
As also discussed, Tivoli ran out of money before the 29 acres were 
developed, thus threatening foreclosure of the very property that it was 
formed to develop. Because of this, it could not have been "obvious" to the 
h·ial court that the LLC Act authorized Defendants to write those checks, 
given that these expenses at least arguably (1) qualified as "significant and 
1naterial purchases," and (2) made it impossible for Tivoli to continue 
functioning. 
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Finally, Defendants' plain error argument also fails because it would 
not have been obvious on this record that they even had the necessary 
profits interest to assert the claimed authority. As noted, Defendants rely 
on portions of the LLC Act that depend on their ownership interest in 
Tivoli, and to establish their ownership interest, they point to the shares 
allocation set forth in the Operating Agreement. Aplt. Br. 24. 
But for purposes of the LLC Act, a member's profits interest is 
determined by his "capital account balances on the date on which 
compliance is measured." Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-803.1 (West 2009); see 
also Op.Agr. at 3.7 (directing that capital accounts would be maintained to 
reflect members' current shares). Thus, although the Operating Agreement 
set forth the "Membership Interests of the initial members," it stated that 
"[c]hanges in Membership Interests after the date of this Agreement" would 
"be reflected in the C01npany' s records," and the "allocation of Membership 
Interests reflected in the Company's records from time to time" would be 
"presumed to be correct" for purposes of both the agree1nent and rights 
under the LLC Act. Op.Agr. at 1.2.12 (emphasis added). 
Here, Defendants provided no proof of what the separate capital 
account balances were on each of the "date[s] on which compliance is 
111easured" (Utah Code Ann. § 78-2c-803.1)-i.e., the separate dates on which 
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they allegedly authorized each check. Without such specific proof, it could 
not have been obvious to the court that there was an evidentiary basis to 
apply these provisions of the LLC Act.3 
C. Defendants have not proven that counsel per£ ormed 
deficiently by not making a futile argument based on the LLC 
Act. 
Defendants' ineffective assistance claim fails for similar reasons. To 
prove ineffective assistance, Defendants must prove that (1) their counsel 
"rendered a demonsh·ably deficient performance that fell below an objective 
standard of reasonable professional judgment" and (2) "that counsel's 
performance resulted in prejudice." Sessions, 2014 UT 44, ,117. The'' failure 
of counsel to 1nake motions or objections which would be futile if raised 
does not constitute ineffective assistance." State v. Binkerd, 2013 UT App 216, 
~29 n.6, 310 P.3d 755. 
As discussed, the Operating Agreement required consent from all the 
members for any change in Tivoli' s business purpose, significant material 
purchases, or any act that would make it impossible for Tivoli to carry out 
its purposes. There was no proof in this record that Defendants ever 
obtained such approval frmn the Poseys. Moreover, the LLC Act also 
3 Defendants also assert that this issue should be reviewed for 
1nanifest injustice. "Manifest injustice is synonymous" with plain error. 
State v. Jimenez, 2012 UT 41, ,I20, 284 P.3d 640. For the reasons set forth 
above with respect to plain error, the manifest injustice clahn fails. 
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required proof from Tivoli' s capital accounts regarding Defendants' 
ownership share on each date on which they allegedly authorized each 
check. There was no such proof. On this record, Defendants accordingly 
have not proven that counsel performed deficiently by not making what 
would have been a futile argument. 
II. 
The court properly submitted the theft counts to the jury. 
Defendants next argue that the court erred when it allowed the jury to 
decide whether they were authorized to write these checks. Aplt. Br. 25-32. 
First, a note about what is-and is not-at issue in this claim. The 
contested element in the theft counts was whether the checks were 
"unauthorized." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404. There is no dispute that, if 
Defendants had wanted, they had a right to have the jury decide this 
elen1ent. See United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 514 (1995) (a defendant 
has a constitutional right to have a jury "draw the ultimate conclusion of 
guilt or innocence"). 
Here, however, Defendants claim that they had authority under the 
Operating Agreement to write these checks, and that because the 
interpretation of a conh·act is a question of law, they had a right to have the 
judge decide this question before trial. Aplt. Br. 25-32. Thus, in contrast to 
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the more usual scenario, Defendants here are claiming that they had a right 
to have the jury not decide this element. 
But Defendants' rights were not violated. It is settled that when a 
contract is a1nbiguous, its interpretation presents a question of fact that may 
be submitted to the jury. Because this Operating Agreement was 
ambiguous as to Defendants' authority, the court did not err by submitting 
the case to the jury. 
A. The interpretation of an unambiguous contract is a question of 
law for the judge, while the interpretation of an ambiguous 
contract is a question of fact for the jury. 
In "a jury trial, questions of law are to be determined by the court," 
while "questions of fact" are determined "by the jury." Utah Code Ann. § 
77-17-10(1) (West 2009). Thus, "juries serve only as fact-finders, not law-
makers or interpreters," and a court may determine "'pure questions of 
law"' itself. State v. Palmer, 2009 UT 55, ilil10, 14, 220 P.3d 1198. 
Defendants were charged with theft, which occurs when a person 
"exercises unauthorized control" over another's property. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-404 (West 2009). Defendants argued below that they had authority 
under the Operating Agreement to write these checks. R1554:96; 1538:31-62, 
63-93. Thus, the question of whether Defendants c01nmitted theft initially 
turned on interpreting their authority under the Operating Agreement. 
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11 A contract's interpretation may be either a question of law, 
determined by the words of the agreement, or a question of fact, determined 
by extrinsic evidence of intent." Peterson v. Sunrider Corp., 2002 UT 43, ~14, 
48 P.3d 918. The difference turns on whether the contract is ambiguous. 
"If the language within the four corners of the contract is 
unambiguous, the parties' intentions are determined from the plain 
meaning of the contractual language, and the conh·act 1nay be interpreted as 
a matter of law." WebBank v. Am. Gen. Annuity Serv. Corp., 2002 UT 88, 119, 
54 P.3d 1139. "However, if the language of the contract is ambiguous such 
that the intentions of the parties cannot be determined by the plain 
language of the agreement, extrinsic evidence 1nust be looked to in order to 
determine the intentions of the parties," and its interpretation becomes a 
question of fact. Id.; accord R&R Energies v. Mother Earth Indus., Inc., 936 P.2d 
1068, 1074 (Utah 1997).4 
Thus, if the Operating Agreement was unambiguous, its 
interpretation became a question of law; but if it was ambiguous, then the 
question of whether Defendants had authority to write these checks became 
4 Defendants point out that this Operating Agree1nent contained an 
integration clause. Aplt. Br. 26-27. Even on an integrated conh·act, extrinsic 
evidence may be admitted to prove the parties' intent as a factual 1natter if 
the "language of the agreement is ambiguous." Tangren Family Trust v. 
Tangren, 2008 UT 20, ilirn, 18, 182 P.3d 326; accord WebBank, 2002 UT 88, 
i122. 
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a question of fact that was properly submitted to the jury for consideration 
alongside extrinsic evidence about the parties' intent. See also State v. Larsen, 
834 P.2d 586, 591 (Utah App. 1992) (because defendant did not have clear 
authority under partnership agreement to take partnership funds, 11 there 
was a legal basis for finding 'unauthorized control,' and it was for the jury 
to decide whether a theft was committed"). 5 
B. Because the Operating Agreement was ambiguous, the court 
properly submitted the question of Defendants' authority to 
the jury. 
"An ambiguity exists in a contract term or provision if it is capable of 
more than one reasonable interpretation because of uncertain meanings of 
tenns, 1nissing terms, or other facial deficiencies." WebBank, 2002 UT 88, 
,r20. Thus, a contract is ambiguous "when it is reasonably capable of being 
understood in more than one sense" and the "contrary positions of the 
parties" are each II tenable." R&R Energies, 936 P.2d at 1074. 
5 The State accordingly notes one other question that is not at issue. If 
the Operating Agree1nent una1nbiguously stated that these checks were not 
authorized, that determination may also have presented a question of law 
under the above authority. But because a defendant has a right to a jury trial 
on all elements, the "judge may not direct a verdict of guilty, in whole or in 
part, no matter how conclusive the evidence." Charles Alan Wright, et al., 2 
Fed. Prac. & Proc. Crim § 371 (4th ed.). This Court need not resolve the 
i1nplications of such a scenario, however, because the State has never 
claiined that the judge should have resolved this as a question of law in its 
favor. 
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As noted, the jury found that Defendants were not authorized to use 
Tivoli funds for expenses associated with their other real estate projects or 
companies. Thus, the question is whether reasonable minds could differ as 
to whether the Agreement authorized such expenses. Reasonable minds 
could differ on three levels. 
1. The agreement was ambiguous as to Tivoli's business 
purpose. 
The Operating Agreement stated that Tivoli was formed "for the sole 
purpose of investing in, purchasing, selling, granting, or taking an option on 
lands for investment purposes and/ or development." Op.Agr. at Recitals, 
#1.6 That same provision directed that Tivoli "shall not conduct any other 
business unless related to the business, unless approved by unanimous consent 
of all Members." Id. (emphasis added). 
At trial, Defendants argued that this provision gave them authority to 
use Tivoli funds for any real estate project, regardless of whether it was tied 
to the 29 acres. R226; 1554:96; 1520:32-34; 1535:129-30, 265, 268. 
But the Operating Agreement also contained language restricting 
Tivoli' s business purpose to those 29 acres. The "Purposes of the 
6 A recitals provision is the "preliininary statement in a contract ... 
explaining the reasons for entering into it." Black's Law Dictionary, Recital 
(10th ed. 2014). This agreement does not contain a provision entitled 
"Recitals." Instead, that inh·oductory section is captioned "Wih1esseth." 
For clarity, the State refers to it as the Recitals section. 
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Company" subsection stated that Tivoli "is organized for the purpose of" 
developing "the Property or any other enterprise that me1nbers may 
mutually agree upon." Op.Agr. at 2.4. In the Definitions section, the term 
"Property" was defined as" approximately 29 acres of real property located 
in Utah County, Utah" that was "the subject of the Purchase Agreement," 
and "Purchase Agreement" was defined to refer to the REPC under which 
the Poseys sold the 29 acres to Equity. Op.Agr. at 1.2.16, 1.2.19. Given these 
provisions, the State contended that the only authorized business purpose 
was the development of the 29 acres. R1554:79-81. 
Again, language is ambiguous if reasonable minds could differ about 
its interpretation. Here, Defendants' appellate approach at least implicitly 
acknowledges that the State's interpretation of the business purpose clauses 
was reasonable. Otherwise~ there would be no need to open the brief by 
arguing that the LLC Act gave Defendants authority to change Tivoli' s 
business purpose. Given this ambiguity, this question was properly 
submitted to the jury. 
2. The agreement was ambiguous as to whether Defendants 
had been appointed as Tivoli' s managers. 
Defendants claimed that they were Tivoli' s managers and had 
authority as managers to write these checks. R1554:96; 1520:35-36; 1521:210-
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11; 1535:126, 263; 1538:52-53. But reasonable 1ninds could differ as to 
whether they were managers under the Operating Agreement. 
The recitals section stated that Tivoli's 1nembers "intend to" appoint a 
manager. Op.Agr. at Recitals, #3. The Definitions section defined the term 
"manager" as meaning "a Person, Persons or Committee, whether or not 
consisting of a Member, Members or not, who is vested with authority to 
manage the Company in accordance with Article VIL" Op.Agr. at 1.2.10. 
By stating that Tivoli "intend[ed] to" appoint a manager, but not then 
identifying Equity or Defendants as managers in the Definitions section, the 
Operating Agreement at least implied that Defendants had not formally 
been appointed as managers. 
By contrast, Defendants relied on a provision stating that Equity had 
authority to "manage and control the affairs of the Company." Op.Agr. at 
7.1(a). While this language gave Equity (and, by extension, Defendants) 
1nanage1nent authority, it did not clearly appoint Equity or Defendants as 
official managers. Instead, given the above, one reasonable interpretation 
would be that this was interim authority that would exist until managers 
were formally appointed. 
Again, a contract's language is ambiguous if reasonable minds could 
differ about its interpretation. Notably, the h·ial judge and the State's 
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forensic accounting expert both stated at h·ial that they thought it unclear 
whether Defendants were managers under the agreement, as did Bobbie 
Posey, who testified that Defendants were not formally appointed as 
managers. R1534:302; 1535:60; 1521:35; 1554:146; 1520:18. 
3. The agreement was ambiguous as to limitations on 
managers' authority. 
The Operating Agreement contained a section that imposed 
lin1itations on managers' authority. Op.Agr. at 7.5. If Defendants were 
managers, two of these limitations that would have been at issue contained 
facially ambiguous terms. 
First, as noted, a manager could not make II any significant material 
purchase" of property without approval of 100% of the members. Op.Agr. 
at 7.5.1. At trial, the State contended that several of the checks qualified as 
"significant purchases." R1535:121-22. But the term II significant" was not 
defined in the Operating Agreement, thus creating an ambiguity as to 
whether these checks ·were prohibited. 
Second, managers could not commit "any act which would make it 
impossible" for Tivoli to carry on its business. Op.Agr. at 7.5.8. The State 
contended at h·ial that the loss of these funds made it "impossible" for 
Tivoli to carry on its ordinary business. R1535:121-22. But the term 
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"impossible" was not defined in this Operating Agree1nent, thus creating 
another ambiguity. 
In short, Defendants can only show that the jury could not determine 
this question if they demonstrate that the Operating Agreement 
unambiguously authorized these expenses. They have not. Because there 
was a "legal basis" for the jury to determine that they did not have such 
authority under the Operating Agreement, "it was for the jury to decide 
whether a theft was committed." Larsen, 834 P.2d at 591. 7 
C. If the court erred by submitting the question to the jury, the 
error was harmless. 
1. The improper submission of a legal question to a jury can 
be harmless. 
In Baird v. Denver R.G.R. Co., 162 P. 79, 81 (Utah 1916), the Utah 
Supreme Court held that although a trial court had improperly submitted a 
question of contract interpretation to the jury, the error was harmless 
7 Defendants do not appear to separately argue that, even if the 
question was properly submitted to the jury, there was insufficient evidence 
to support the jury's finding that these checks were unauthorized. 
In any event, such an argument would plainly fail. The Poseys both 
unequivocally testified that Defendants were not authorized to write these 
checks for these purposes. See R1554:138, 142-43, 147-48, 160-63, 170-72 
(Bobbie); R1521:140-41, 147, 151-53, 171-77 (Kerry). This was supported by 
an Equity board 111en1ber who sat in on Tivoli's board n1eetings. R1534:77-
78, 80-92. And it was also supported by testimony frmn the State's 
investigator, who testified that in an initial interview, Defendants both 
ad1nitted that they knew they were not authorized to use Tivoli funds for 
anything other than the development of the 29 acres. R1534:192-93, 276. 
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because II the jury found in accordance with what the court should have 
declared as a 1natter of law." 
This kind of situation does not appear to have since been addressed 
by a Utah appellate court. But Baird's approach comports with the general 
rule, which is that the ''[s]ubmission of a question of law to the jury" is 
harmless if the jury II answered as the trial court should have answered" it. 
5 Am.Jur.2d, Appellate Review § 694; see also Sabatini v. Its Amore Corp., 455 
Fed. Appx. 251 at *7 (3d Cir. 2011); Reed & Martin, Inc. v. Honolulu, 440 P.2d 
526, 528 (Haw. 1968); Schneider v. Girard Trust Bank, 218 A.2d 259, 260 (Pa. 
1966); Bank of America v. Jeff Taylor LLC, 358 S.W.3d 848, 865 (Tex. App. 
2012). 
2. Any error was harmless. 
If the court should have interpreted the Operating Agreement itself, 
rather than submitting it to the jury, the error was harmless because the jury 
got it right. Indeed, if anything, the agreement unambiguously prohibited 
Defendants fr01n writing these checks. 
First, the Operating Agreement stated that Tivoli was organized for 
the purpose of developing and selling II the Property," and it defined "the 
Property" to refer to the 29 acres. Op.Agr. at 1.2.16, 1.2.19, 2.4. The 
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agreement then limited Defendants' management authority to that purpose. 
Op.Agr. at 7.1. 
As noted, the recitals section also contained some language arguably 
suggesting that the business purpose extended to any real estate 
development. Op.Agr., Recitals, #1. But if this was indeed an unambiguous 
contract as Defendants must claim, then the more specific language 
described above controls. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 203 
(1981) ("In the interpretation of a promise or agreement or a term thereof, 
... (c) specific terms and exact terms are given greater weight than general 
language."); accord Wood v. Utah Fann Bureau Ins. Co., 2001 UT App 35, if 7, 
19 P.3d 392. 
Second, the Operating Agreen1ent prohibited a manager from doing 
anything that "would make it impossible" for Tivoli "to carry on its 
ordinary business and affairs." Op.Agr. at 7.5.8. To the extent that this was 
an unambiguous legal provision, the jury was entitled to determine as a 
factual 1natter that these expenses deprived Tivoli of funds it needed to 
bring the 29 acres to entitlement, thus making it impossible to carry on its 
purpose. 
Third, the Operating Agree1nent prevented a manager from making 
"any significant material" purchase without approval of 100% of the 
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members. Op.Agr. at 7.5.1. To the extent that this was an unambiguous 
legal provision, the jury was entitled to determine as a factual matter that 
these expenses were "significant" -and that Defendants' use of the funds 
was therefore unauthorized. 
III. 
Defendants were not entitled to a reduction of their 
convictions based on their ownership interest in Tivoli. 
In Point II of their brief, Defendants 1nake a two-part argument that 
they claim should have resulted in the dismissal of all but four of the theft 
counts. 
First, the degree of offense for a theft depends on the value of the 
stolen property. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412(1) (West 2009). Defendants 
argue that because they owned 75% of Tivoli, they owned 75% of its funds. 
Aplt. Br. 35-42. Defendants then reason that because a "person cannot be 
charged with stealing his own property," they could only be convicted for 
stealing 25% of the value of each check. Id. According to Defendants, this 
would have reduced all but four of the thefts to 1nisdemeanors. Aplt. Br. 19, 
41-42. 
Second, felony theft has a four-year statute of limitations, but 
1nisden1eanor theft has a two-year statute of limitations. Utah Code Ann. § 
76-1-302(1) (West 2009). These charges were filed more than two years after 
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the thefts, so Defendants argue that each theft that should have been 
reduced to a misdemeanor should have been dismissed as untimely. Aplt. 
Br. 41-42. 
Defendants' arguments fail for two reasons. First, Defendants' 
claimed ownership interest provided no defense to theft. Second, even if 
the ownership interest could matter, it didn't here because Defendants' 
ownership was in Tivoli, not its money. 
A. Defendants' ownership interest provided no defense to theft. 
Under Utah law, it "is no defense" to theft if "the actor has an interest 
in the property or service stolen if another person also has an interest that 
the actor is not entitled" to infringe. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402(2) (West 
2009). 
Defendants assert that they owned 75% of Tivoli and that the Poseys 
owned 25%. Aplt. Br. 18-19, 41. Defendants thus admit that the Poseys 
"also ha[ d] an interest" in Tivoli. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402(2). Because of 
this, Defendants' interest-even their conh·olling interest-did not provide 
the1n with a "fractional" or "proportional" defense to the theft charges. 
Rather, under Utah law, their interest provided "no defense" at all. Id. 
Defendants' clai1n fails for this reason alone. 
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B. Even if Defendants' ownership interest in Tivoli could provide 
a defense, it did not here because the interest was in Tivoli, not 
its money. 
A Utah LLC "is a legal entity distinct from its members." Utah Code 
Ann. § 48-2c-104 (West 2009). While a member of an LLC has "an 
ownership interest in [the] company," Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-102(14) 
(West 2009), the member "has no interest in specific property of a 
company." Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-701(1)-(2) (West 2009); accord In re 
McCauley, 520 B.R. 874, 882 (Bankr., D. Utah 2014). 
An LLC' s me1nbers "generally have been found to have no interest in 
the LLC's assets," including "members who own all the interests in single 
member LLCs." J. William Callison and Maureen A. Sullivan, Limited 
LiabilihJ Companies: A State-by-State Guide to Law and Practice, § 4:1 (2015). 
What a member instead owns is a "share of the LLC's profits and losses" 
and the "right to receive distributions of LLC assets." Id. 
This construct is set forth in Tivoli's Operating Agreement, which 
defines a "me1nbership interest" as a "Member's percentage interest in the 
Company, consisting of the Member's right to share in Profits, receive 
dish·ibutions, participate in the Company's governance, approve the 
Company's acts, participate in the designation and removal of a Manager, 
and receive information pertaining to the Company's affairs." Op.Agr. at 
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1.2.12. Nowhere does the Operating Agreement separately grant 1nembers 
an interest in Tivoli' s actual funds. 
Though subtle, this distinction makes sense, and it is integral to the 
proper functioning of the corporate system. If a person owns stock in 
Apple, for example, he owns a portion of the company. But that does not 
mean that he also owns a portion of its money. For example, an Apple 
shareholder could not walk into an Apple store, reach into the cash register, 
and take out money equal to the value of his stock. 
But that is essentially what Defendants are claiming that they could 
do here. Defendants are claiming that because they owned portions of 
Tivoli, they owned an equivalent portion of its money and could use it 
however they wanted. This argument has been rejected, however, by a 
wide array of cases from both Utah and other jurisdictions that have 
affirmed theft or theft-related convictions in similar circmnstances. 
In State v. Stites, 297 P.2d 227, 229 (Utah 1956), for example, the Utah 
Supre1ne Court upheld a shareholder's conviction for misapplication of 
corporate funds, even though the shareholder II owned all but four shares of 
the stock" and was /l'practically its only shareholder." The court reasoned 
that "[s]o long as the corporation is an entity and owns the money, and that 
money is withheld or taken and used for non-corporate purposes, ... there 
-35-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
is no escape from the conclusion that there has been a wrongful and 
intentional" misapplication of corporate funds. Id. 
In State v. Radzvilmuicz, 703 A.2d 767, 777 (Conn. 1997), the court 
similarly stressed that it is "an elementary principle of corporate law that a 
corporation and its stockholders are separate entities and that the title to the 
corporate property is vested in the corporation and not in the owner of the 
corporate stock." Thus, "even the controlling stockholder cannot transfer or 
assign the corporation's properties" or "apply corporate funds to personal 
debts or objects." Id. Other courts have agreed, allowing convictions for 
theft-related offenses where a shareholder misused or took corporate funds 
without proper authorization. See, e.g., United States v. Falcone, 934 F.2d 
1528, 1547 (11th Cir. 1991); LaParle v. State, 957 P.2d 330, 333-35 (Alaska Ct. 
App. 1998); State v. Hill, 296 P.3d 412, 418-19 (Idaho App. 2012); State v. 
Sylvester, 516 N.W.2d 845, 849 (Iowa 1994); State v. Gagne, 79 A.3d 448, 455 
(N.H. 2013); State v. Gard, 742 N.W.2d 257, 262-63 (S.D. 2007). 
The North Carolina Supreme Court has even applied this rule to a 
case in which the defendant owned all of a company's shares. In State v. 
Kornegay, 326 S.E.2d 881, 889 (N.C. 1985), the court reasoned that once 
money becomes the corporation's money, the defendant's ownership of the 
company - even his sole ownership- becomes irrelevant. "Having 
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organized a corporation and conducted his business through it in order to 
obtain the benefits and protections of the corporate form, defendant may 
not now ignore the corporate entity and treat corporate funds as his own." 
Id. If it were otherwise- i.e., if stockholders could "legally convert all of a 
corporation's assets to their own use" - 11 those dealing with the corporation 
on the faith of its property might be irretrievably injured." Id. 
Thus, contrary to Defendants' position, they did not own Tivoli' s 
funds. Rather, they owned portions of Tivoli itself. Because of this, they 
could properly be convicted of theft for the full value of each check, and 
their reduction-of-offense and statute of limitations arguments both fail. 8 
8 The State recognizes that the prosecutor below suggested that the 
Poseys also had an ownership interest in the funds. See, e.g., Rl447; 1535:39, 
156; 1538:19-20. Under the above authority, the Poseys were in the same 
position as Defendants and did not. 
But this Court may affirm on any ground apparent from the record. 
Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, i110, 52 P.3d 1158. Here, Defendants themselves 
repeatedly claimed that this was Tivoli's money. See, e.g., R1513:6-7 (Bruun's 
counsel arguing that the II money alleged to have been stolen in each of the 
counts charged was never the property of the Poseys. It was in each case an 
asset of Tivoli Properties, LLC."); R1514:6 (Diderickson's counsel arguing 
that "this wasn't the Poseys' money. The money was an asset of Tivoli."); 
R1535:68 (Diderickson' s counsel asserting to jury that if Defendants II stole 
anything," they "really com1nitted a theft against Tivoli, not against the 
Poseys, because it becaine Tivoli' s money"). 
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C. State v. Parker does not compel a different result. 
Despite the above authority, Defendants argue that State v. Parker, 137 
P.2d 626 (Utah 1943), compels a different result. Aplt. Br. 36-37. 
In Parker, the court held that a car owner could be convicted of theft 
for taking his car back from a mechanic before satisfying the mechanic's 
lien. 137 P.2d at 626-34. Although the majority agreed on_ the result, the 
case produced an unusually fractured lineup- four opinions ca1ne from the 
five justices. 
Defendants rely on a concurring opinion from Chief Justice Wolf. 
After agreeing that this could be theft, the Chief Justice opined that under 
common law rules regarding bailors and bailees, the amount of the theft 
would be limited to the amount of money the owner owed the mechanic, 
rather than the value of the car. Id. at 631 (Wolfe, C.J., concurring). Two 
other justices expressed the same view. Id. at 632-33 (McDonough, J., 
concurring); id. at 634 (VVade, J., concurring). 
Moreover, theft requires proof that the person exercised 
"unauthorized control over the property of another," but it does not require 
the jury to determine who the other owner was. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404; 
accord Larsen, 834 P.2d at 591 (Utah App. 1992) (to "obtain conviction for 
theft, the State does not have to prove who owned the property"). By 
convicting Defendants, the jury found that the money was not theirs. 
Legally, this was enough, and affirming on this ground is warranted. 
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Defendants analogize this to this situation, claiming that their thefts 
should be limited by the a1nount of their interest in Tivoli. Aplt. Br. 36-37. 
But the discussion at issue frmn the Parker opinions centered on the 
"special property" interest that a bailor has in the property under his 
control. Parker, 137 P.2d at 631 (Wolfe, C.J., concurring). As discussed 
above, however, Defendants did not own Tivoli' s funds; rather, they owned 
a share in Tivoli itself. Thus, the unique "shared ownership" concepts 
inherent in Parker are not present here and the rule is inapplicable. 
Moreover, the question in Parker was whether a bailee could be 
charged with theft of his own property. Because the court held that a bailee 
could, the discussion in the separate opinions about the amount of theft was 
dicta. See id. at 626-34. 
But Parker's underlying holding has since been legislatively 
abrogated. As noted, the current theft statute states that it "is no defense" 
to theft if another person has an interest in the property. That provision 
then goes on to state that this limitation does not apply when the other's 
interest is "a security interest for the repayment of a debt or obligation." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402(2). In other words, the current law has removed 
the State's ability to charge a bailee with theft for taking his own property, 
thus overruling the cmnmon law doctrine at issue in Parker. 
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Because of this, Defendants are ultimately relying on a dicta-derived 
valuation rule that ·was applicable to a type of theft that no longer exists. 
This is not good authority and should not be followed, particularly where it 
conflicts with current rules prohibiting corporate theft detailed above. 
IV. 
Defendants did not receive ineffective assistance when their 
counsel withdrew a request for a wrongful appropriation 
instruction. 
"Wrongful appropriation is a lesser included offense" of theft. Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-404.5(4) (West 2009). Like theft, wrongful appropriation 
requires proof that the defendant obtained or exercised "unauthorized 
control over the property of another." Id. § 76-6-404.5(1). The difference is 
that in wrongful appropriation, the person acts "with intent to temporarily 
appropriate, possess, or use" the property. Id. (emphasis added). 
At trial, defense counsel specifically withdrew a request for a 
wrongful appropriation instruction. R1537:214. Defendants now argue that 
their counsel was ineffective for doing so. Aplt. Br. 42-47. 
A. Defendants have not proven deficient performance. 
1. Counsel had a legitimate reason to not request the 
instruction. 
Defendants must first prove deficient performance. 11 An attorney's 
performance is deficient under Strickland if it can be shown to have fallen 
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below an objective standard of reasonableness." Sessions, 2014 UT 44, if 18. 
Defendants must overcome a strong presumption that counsel "rendered 
adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of 
reasonable professional judgment." Burt v. Titlow, 134 S.Ct. 10, 17 (2013). 
To overcome this strong presumption, Defendants must demonstrate that 
"there was no conceivable tactical basis for counsel's actions." State v. Clark, 
2004 UT 25, if 6, 89 P.3d 162 (emphasis in original). 
Thus, the "threshold question under Strickland is not whether some 
strategy other than the one that counsel employed looks superior given the 
actual results of trial. It is whether a reasonable, competent lawyer could 
have chosen the strategy that was employed in the real-time context of 
trial." State v. Barela, 2015 UT 22, ,J21, 349 P.3d 676; accord State v. Nelson, 
2015 UT 62, ~16, 792 Utah Adv. Rep. 67. 
Here, Defendants seem to suggest that because they were entitled to 
the instruction, counsel was required to request it. Aplt. Br. 43-44. But the 
Sixth A1nendment "does not require counsel to argue every reasonable 
theory" in a case. State v. Lucero, 2014 UT 15, ,I54 (emphasis in original). To 
the conh·ary, "counsel's decision to choose one of two alternative, 
reasonable trial strategies is not grounds for an ineffective assistance of 
counsel ruling." Id. at if 53. This extends to lesser included offense 
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instructions, where this Court "generally affords deference to defense 
counsel's decision to request or not request a lesser-included-offense" 
instruction. Jackson v. State, 2015 UT App 217, ,r1s n.7, -- Utah Adv. Rep.--. 
Here, Defendants' counsel could have reasonably decided to not 
request the wrongful appropriation instruction for two reasons. 
First, counsel could reasonably decide to not request this instruction 
as part of an "' all or nothing' strategy" - i.e., a strategy designed to 
maximize a defendant's chance for acquittal, rather than risking the chance 
that the jury would convict on a lesser included offense as a compromise. 
State v. Feldmiller, 2013 UT App 275, if3, 316 P.3d 991; accord State v. Dyer, 
671 P.2d 142, 145 (Utah 1983); State v. Valdez, 432 P.2d 53, 54 (Utah 1967). 
There was a particular reason why such an approach would make 
sense in this case. Defendants were businessmen with no prior criminal 
records who were charged with non-violent offenses. Rl 149-50, 1169-70 
(PSI's). During a discussion midway through trial, the judge openly stated 
that it was "outrageous" for defense counsel to have suggested in front of 
the jury that the defendants might serve a lengthy prison term. R1536:62. 
The judge then explained to the parties: "I doubt that the State is even 
seeking prison in this case, let alone a consecutive sentence. I have no 
intention of putting these men in prison." Id. ~ 
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At that point, Defendants knew that they faced no risk of long-term 
incarceration. Because of this, their remaining risk was the possibility of 
conviction itself. But given their backgrounds, many of the consequences 
that would come with a conviction for theft would also come with a 
conviction for wrongful appropriation. After all, Defendants were self-
employed real estate developers. Even if they were convicted of wrongful 
appropriation, rather than theft, they still could have lost their professional 
licenses. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-401(2)(a) (West 2009) (DOPL "may 
refuse to issue a license" if an applicant "has engaged in unprofessional 
conduct, as defined by state or rule"); Utah Code Ann. § 61-2f-401 (West 
2009) (real estate licenses may be revoked if a person is "convicted of a 
criminal offense involving moral turpitude" within five years); Utah 
Admin. Code R. 162-2f-201(1)(ii) (certain real estate licenses "shall be 
denied" if the applicant was convicted of "a misdemeanor involving fraud, 
misrepresentation, theft, or dishonesty" within three years); Utah Admin. 
Code R. 156-1-302 ( allowing suspension of license if an applicant "has failed 
to den1onsh·ate good 1noral character" or "has been involved in unlawful 
conduct"). 
Moreover, wrongful appropriation convictions could also have 
dramatically impaired their future business prospects. As noted, a 
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wrongful appropriation conviction would represent a finding that 
Defendants had temporarily exercised "unauthorized control" over 
another's property. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404.5(1). The fact that a 
wrongful appropriation conviction would have only signaled a temporary, 
as opposed to permanent, theft would likely have been of little reassurance 
to prospective future investors, banks, or clients. 
Counsel could have therefore reasonably decided to forego 
requesting the instruction in the hopes that Defendants might be acquitted 
ouh·ight. Given the complexities of this case, they were not without reason 
to have such hope, as evidenced by Defendants' acquittal on the majority of 
the theft charges. 
Second, as a separate matter, counsel could also have reasonably 
believed that an alternative defense of wrongful appropriation would have 
hurt Defendants because it was "inconsistent" their Defendants' claim of 
outright innocence. Feldmiller, 2013 UT App 275, if4. Counsel could have 
surmised that they could not credibly argue to the jury that Defendants 
never intended to unlawfully deprive Tivoli of its funds at all ... but that if 
they did, they only intended to temporarily deprive Tivoli of its funds. 
Pushing such an approach could have jeopardized the possibility of any 
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acquittal, and counsel could therefore have reasonably decided to withdraw 
the request for the instruction. 
2. The record does not support Defendants' claim that the 
decision to withdraw the instruction was unreasonably 
based on an agreement with the prosecutor. 
Defendants alternatively claim that counsel's decision to withdraw 
the request for a wrongful appropriation instruction was umeasonably 
based on an unfulfilled II stipulation" from the State. Aplt. Br. 44-46. 
As an initial matter, it does not matter whether this was counsel's 
actual motivation. The question under Strickland's first element is whether 
counsel's performance fell below II an objective standard of reasonable 
professional judgment." Sessions, 2014 UT 44, if17 (emphasis added). Thus, 
this Court's "consideration of counsel's performance does not depend on 
'counsel's subjective state of mind"; instead, what matters is "the objective 
reasonableness of counsel's perfonnance." Jackson, 2015 UT App 217, if 19. 
As discussed above, reasonably competent counsel could have 
decided to not request the instruction here. This, alone, defeats this claim. 
Second, the record also does not support Defendants' claim that 
counsel withdrew the request based on a stipulation with the prosecutor. 
Aplt. Br. 44-46. 
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After conviction, Defendants filed a new h·ial motion in which they 
argued that the question of who owned what percentage of Tivoli' s money 
was a legal question that should have been decided by the court. R1380-91. 
Explaining the procedural history, defense counsel represented that they 
had an agreement with the prosecutor in which they could wait to raise this 
issue until after trial if they were convicted. R1385. Counsel further 
represented that they had decided to not request a lesser included offense 
instruction on wrongful appropriation "in anticipation of obtaining a 
considered ruling" on the ownership issue after trial if it proved necessary. 
R1383. Defendants then contended that, "[i]n hindsight" and with "more 
mature consideration," they believed that they should have pushed for a 
ruling on ownership before the case was submitted to the jury. R1383-84. 
Thus, the record does not support Defendants' claim on appeal that 
their decision to withdraw the wrongful appropriation request was part of a 
stipulation with the State. Rather, the record shows that they 1nade the 
decision the1nselves, based on their belief that they would either (1) be 
acquitted by the jury, or (2) obtain legal relief after h·ial through a new trial 
n1otion. 
The fact that counsel later regretted this approach is of no import. 
When reviewing an ineffective assistance claim, "every effort" must be 
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made to "eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight" and II not question" 
counsel's decisions "unless there is no reasonable basis supporting them." 
Nelson, 2015 UT 62, ,116; accord Barela, 2015 UT 22, ,121. 
As discussed, there was a reasonable basis for withdrawing the 
request for a wrongful appropriation instruction: it put the State to a higher 
burden of proof and made acquittal ·more likely. Regardless of whether 
defense counsel later regretted that decision, it was still reasonable at the 
time, and Defendants' claim thus fails. 
B. Defendants were not prejudiced because it is not probable that 
the jury would have convicted them of wrongful 
appropriation. 
Defendants must also prove that there is "a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Here, there is not a 
reasonable probability that the jury would have convicted Defendants of 
wrongful appropriation if the instruction had been given. 
As noted, the difference between theft and wrongful appropriation is 
that in theft, the defendant has a "purpose to deprive" the owner of his 
property, while in wrongful appropriation, he intends to "temporarily 
deprive the owner" of his property. Compare Utah Code Aim. § 76-6-404 
with Utah Code Aim.§ 76-6-404.5. 
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Bruun testified at h·ial. In his testimony, he never claimed that he and 
Diderickson intended to temporarily steal Tivoli' s funds. Instead, he 
insisted that they had authority to use these funds for these purposes. See 
R1535:265-71. 
Given that Defendants steadfastly justified these checks, there was no 
reason for the jury to believe that they intended to give the money back 
after a temporary period. Because of this, there is no probability that the 
outcome would have changed if the instruction had been given. 9 
V. 
Defendants have not proven that counsel was ineffective for 
not requesting an additional UPUAA instruction. 
Defendants were also .convicted of one count of engaging in a pattern 
of unlawful activity (UPUAA). R967-70. Under the UPUAA statute, it is a 
crime for a person who is "associated with any enterprise" to "participate, 
whether directly or indirectly, in the conduct of that enterprise's affairs 
through a pattern of unlawful activity." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1603(3) 
(West 2009). A "pattern of unlawful activity" includes "the commission of 
9 Defendants also claim that this is review able for manifest injustice. 
Aplt. Br. 47. Under invited error, however, "a party on appeal cannot take 
advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led the trial court 
into comn1itting the error." State v. Alfatlawi, 2006 UT App 511, ,I26, 153 
P.3d 804. As noted, counsel affirmatively withdrew a request for a 
wrongful appropriation instruction. R1537:214. Invited error thus bars this 
claim. 
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at least three episodes of unlawful activity, which episodes are not 
isolated," and which "demonstrate continuing unlawful conduct." Utah 
Code Ann.§ 76-10-1602(2) (West 2009). 
The jury was instructed about all of the above elements and 
definitions. R952-54. Defendants nevertheless argue that the instructions 
were incomplete- but not because they omitted any statutory language. 
Rather, Defendants argue that the court should also have instructed the jury 
that to qualify as "continuing unlawful conduct," the thefts must have 
"occurred over a substantial period of time." Aplt. Br. 48. 
Here, Defendants were convicted for writing checks over a nine-
n1onth period-specifically, check 1007 (the basis for count 2) was written in 
December 2007, while check 1070 (the basis for count 28) was written in 
Septe1nber 2008. R69-78, 971-73; Addendum D. Defendants thus argue that, 
if the jury had been instructed that the thefts must have occurred over a 
"substantial period of time," it would have concluded that nine months did 
not suffice and therefore acquitted them of UPUAA charge. Aplt. Br. 47-53. 
Defendants admit that they never requested such an insh·uction 
below, but argue that this should be reviewed for plain error or ineffective 
assistance. Aplt. Br. 52-53. 
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A. This Court cannot review this issue for plain error. 
Under the invited error doctrine, "a party on appeal cannot take 
advantage of an error c01n1nitted at trial when that party led the h·ial court 
into committing the error." Alfatlawi, 2006 UT App 511, if 26. Where a party 
"confirm[s] on the record that the defense had no objection to the 
instructions given by the trial court," the invited error doctrine forecloses 
plain error review. State v. Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, if 10, 86 P.3d 742. 
During a break at trial, Bruun's counsel informed the court that the 
parties had "agreed on all but one instruction." R1537:213. The parties then 
discussed the one remaining dispute with the court-a dispute that 
centered on one of the theft instructions. R1537:213-20. At the close of that 
discussion, defense counsel affirmatively approved the remaining 
instructions. R1537:220. Defense counsel never separately pointed to any 
deficiency in the UPU AA instructions. 
Defendants accordingly cannot obtain relief for plain error. Instead, 
they can obtain relief only if they demonstrate that counsel was ineffective. 
State v. Sellers, 2011 UT App 38, if 13, 248 P.3d 70. 10 
10 Defendants also suggest that this is reviewable for a "1nanifest 
injustice." Again, "manifest injustice" is "synony1nous with the plain error 
standard." Pullman, 2013 UT App 168, ,IS. Defendants' "manifest injustice" 
clailn is accordingly likewise barred by invited error. 
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B. Defendants have not proven deficient performance. 
Defendants must first prove that counsel's performance fell "below 
an objective standard of reasonableness." Sessions, 2014 UT 44, ,118. 
Defendants must prove that counsel's "representation amounted to 
incompetence under prevailing professional norms," not just that it 
"deviated from best practices or most common custom." Harrington v. 
Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 88 (2011). 
Defendants' deficient performance claim fails for two reasons. First, 
counsel did not perform deficiently because there was no controlling law 
that entitled Defendants to such an instruction. And second, trial counsel 
had several reasonable bases for choosing not to request the additional 
insh·uction here. 
1. No controlling law entitled Defendants to an additional 
instruction. 
Defense counsel's decisions must be evaluated "from counsel's 
perspective at the time." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Thus, to prove the first 
Strickland ele1nent, Defendants must demonstrate that, "on the basis of the 
law in effect at the time of h·ial, [their] trial counsel's performance was 
deficient." State v. Dwm, 850 P.2d 1201, 1228 (Utah 1993); see also Menzies v. 
State, 2014 UT 40, if 76, 344 P.3d 581. 
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Defendants accordingly cannot prevail by simply showing that 
counsel did not advance "a novel legal theory which has never been 
accepted by the pertinent courts." State v. Love, 2014 UT App 175, 'if7, 332 
P.3d 383. Instead, to show deficient performance, Defendants must show 
that counsel disregarded "controlling appellate law" that existed at the time 
of trial. State v. Kerr, 2010 UT App 50, 'jf9, 228 P.3d 1255; see also In re N.A.D., 
2014 UT App 249, 'if 6, 338 P.3d 226. 
As noted, UPUAA requires proof of a "pattern of unlawful activity," 
and a "pattern of unlawful activity" is defined as "continuing unlawful 
conduct." Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-10-1602(2), -1603(3). According to 
Defendants, what was missing here was an additional definitions 
instruction that would define the phrase "continuing unlawful conduct" as 
conduct that occurred over a "substantial period of time." Aplt. Br. 47-52. 
Thus, to be clear, what Defendants are faulting their counsel for is not 
requesting an additional definitions instruction for one of the definitions of 
one of the elements of the UPUAA count. 
The proble1n is that no case entitled them to this insh·uction. 
Defendants draw their proposed "substantial period of time" insh·uction 
fro1n Hill v. Estate of Allred, 2009 UT 28, ,I,I38-41, 216 P.3d 929. There, the 
supreme court did suggest that the "continuing conduct" element of a 
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UPUAA claim is satisfied if the conduct "extend[ed] over a substantial 
period of time." Id. 
But the question 1n Hill was not about the adequacy of jury 
instructions. Rather, the question was about whether the evidence in that 
case was sufficient to support the UPUAA conviction. See id. Although the 
court used the "substantial period of time" language as part of its analysis, 
the court did not say that trial courts must always give an instruction 
including that definition in every UPUAA prosecution. 
Defendants point to no Utah case, and the State is aware of none, in 
which any Utah court has held that a "substantial period of time" 
instruction must be included in a UPUAA case. This defeats their clairn, 
because, again, counsel does not violate the Sixth Amendment for not 
advancing "a novel legal theory which has never been accepted by the 
pertinent courts." Love, 2014 UT App 175, ~7. 
This is particularly so here given that it remains an open question as 
to whether such an instruction is required. While a "party is entitled to 
have the jury instructed on its theory of the case" if evidence supports it, a 
"party is not entitled to have the jury insh·ucted with any particular 
wording." State v. Marchet, 2012 UT App 197, ,Il7, 284 P.3d 668. Thus, if 
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"the jury instructions as a whole fairly instructed the jury on the applicable 
law," ,,,it is not error to refuse a particular instruction." Id. 
As Defendants note, the UPUAA statute is patterned after the federal 
RICO statute; it is for this reason that Defendants largely rely on federal 
RICO cases to support this claim. Aplt. Br. 50-51. But many federal courts 
have held that a court is not required to include the "substantial period of 
time" "clarification" in RICO jury instructions. Indeed, federal decisions 
sometimes go beyond that, holding that jury instructions are not even 
required to include the "continuous conduct" definition for the "pattern of 
unlawful activity" element. 
In United States v. Boylan, 898 F.2d 230, 250 (1st Cir. 1990), for 
example, the court held that the element in a RICO prosecution is the 
-"pattern of unlawful activity." By contrast, "continuity is not an element of 
a RI CO offense," but is instead a "necessary characteristic of the evidence 
used to prove the existence of a pattern." 898 F.2d at 250. Thus, while the 
concept of "continuity" helps define the "pattern" element, the "word itself 
should not be accorded talismanic significance," and its absence from the 
jury insh·uctions does not constitute plain error. Id. 
Many other federal courts have followed this approach. See, e.g., 
United States v. Celestine, 43 Fed. Appx. 586, 591 (4th Cir. 2002) Gury 
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insh·uctions must "incorporate the concept of continuity," but it is enough if 
the insh·uctions "requir[e] the jury to find a pattern of activity, and not just 
isolated acts"); United States v. Kotvas, 941 F.2d 1141, 1144 (11th Cir. 1991) 
(no error where instructions did not include "continuity" requirement, 
because instructions required proof of a "pattern"); cf United States v. Dote, 
150 F.Supp.2d 935, 940 (N.D. Ill. 2001) ('"Continuity' is not an element of a 
RICO violation, and need not be plead with particularity to survive a 
motion to dismiss"); United States v. Mavroules, 819 F.Supp. 1109, 1117-18 (D. 
Mass. 1993) ("continuity" "need not be alleged" in a RICO indictment 
because "continuity is not an element of a RICO offense"). 
Thus, at the time of this trial, federal cases suggested that instructions 
are sufficient if they insh·ucted the jury on the pattern of activity element, as 
well as the concept of continuity. No Utah case required more. Because of 
this, Defendants cannot show that their counsel performed deficiently by 
not requesting an additional insh·uction. 
2. There was a tactical reason for not requesting this 
instruction. 
A deficient performance clailn also fails if there was any "conceivable 
tactical basis for counsel's actions." Clark, 2004 UT 25, ~ 6. Here, even if 
Defendants were entitled to an additional insh·uction, counsel could 
reasonably have decided to not request it. 
,.. ... 
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As noted, UPU AA requires proof that the person engaged in "a 
pattern of unlawful activity," and it defines a "pattern of unlawful activity" 
as II continuing unlawful conduct." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1602(2), -
1603(3). 
Hill addressed the question of what it means to be "continuing." 2009 
UT 28, ,r,r33-42. Interpreting that term, the court relied on heavily on H.J. 
Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989), a decision that 
interpreted a similar element in the RICO statute. Hill, 2009 UT 28, 1if33-42. 
Hill concluded that there can be two kinds of II continuous" criminal 
conduct. First, there may be a II closed" period of continuity, wherein the 
conduct "extend[ ed] over a substantial period of time." Id. at 139. Second, 
there may be an II open" period of continuous conduct. Id. This occurs 
when the pattern of unlawful activity was "interrupted" before it covered a 
substantial period of time, but there was proof that it likely would have 
continued without the interruption. Allwaste, Inc. v. Hecht, 65 F.3d 1523, 
1529-30 (9th Cir. 1995). Thus, if a UPUAA action is prosecuted as an open 
continuity case, proof that there was a "threat of continuity" without the 
interruption is enough. Hill, 2009 UT 28, il39. 
Against this backdrop, defense counsel here could have reasonably 
decided to not request a "substantial period of time" insh·uction. The 
-56-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
current instructions did not draw attention to the open/ dosed continuity 
distinction. But if counsel had requested an instruction on the II substantial 
period of time" definition, this would have drawn attention to this 
distinction because, again, the substantial period of time definition only 
applies to closed continuity cases. Hill, 2009 UT 28, ~39; H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 
242. 
But if this distinction became a focus, the State could have avoided 
any II substantial period of time" limitation altogether by now pushing this 
as open-continuity prosecution. Indeed, such an approach would have been 
consistent with prior Utah cases, which have held that open continuity can 
be established through short periods of time that rese1nble the period of 
time at issue here. See, e.g., State v. McGrath, 749 P.2d 631, 635 (Utah 1988) 
(open-continuity pattern spanned five months); State v. Nichols, 2003 UT 
App 287, if,f15-22, 76 P.3d 1173 (open-continuity pattern spanned 
approximately six 1nonths). Indeed, federal courts have held that open 
continuity can occur in as little as two months. See, e.g., Sun. Savings and 
Loan Ass'n v. Dierdoff, 825 F.2d 187, 194 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. 
Busacca, 936 F.2d 232, 238 (6th Cir. 1991). Thus, any tactical gains that 
Defendants achieved through this instruction could have been short-lived if 
the State simply shifted focus. 
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Moreover, if the State had been prompted to pursue this as an open-
continuity case, this could have further backfired because of the particular 
kind of proof at issue in such prosecutions. Again, the question in an open-
continuity case is whether there was a "threat of continuity" before the 
pattern was disrupted. Hill, 2009 UT 28, ~39; H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 242. One 
way to prove this is by showing that the criminal conduct was the 
defendant's "regular way of conducting" business. H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 243. 
When assessing an ineffective assistance claim, courts give deference 
to the choices of trial counsel, in part, because, "unlike a later reviewing 
court," the attorney "knew of material outside the record and interacted 
with the client." Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105. On this record, it is conceivable 
that the reason counsel avoided this issue was a worry the State would have 
responded by pursuing this as an open-continuity case-which would have 
then caused the State to inquire further as to whether Defendants' conduct 
was indicative of their regular business practice. 
Indeed, the record already provides a basis for such a worry. 
Defendants had worked together on real estate projects for years. 
R1535:208-09. When Bruun testified at trial, he was decidedly unrepentant, 
repeatedly insisting that what he and Diderickson did with Tivoli's money 
was justified because they were Tivoli's managers. R1535:265-71. Notably, 
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Bobbie Posey testified that when the Poseys met with Defendants to form 
Tivoli, they signed forms that Defendants had drafted. R1554:121. One 
reasonable inference from this is that this was the way that Defendants did 
business. 
Again, Defendants must show that there was no conceivable basis for 
this decision. Here, counsel could reasonably have believed that requesting 
an instruction that was only applicable to a closed-continuity UPUAA claim 
(1) would not help, because the prosecutor could avoid any limitations by 
pressing this as an open-continuity claim, and (2) it could have backfired by 
prompting the prosecutor to now ask questions about Defendants' business 
practices. This was reason to leave the jury instructions alone, and the 
deficient performance claim fails. 
C. Defendants were not prejudiced because it is not probable that 
the jury would have acquitted them on the UPUAA count if 
given the additional instruction. 
Defendants must also prove prejudice. They have not. 
First, if Defendants had pushed for a substantial period of time 
insh~uction, the State could have simply avoided any limitation imposed by 
this by now pressing this as an open-continuity prosecution. As noted, the 
time period at issue here - nine 111onths - is well within the range of periods 
approved in such cases. See, e.g., McGrath, 749 P.2d at 635; Nichols, 2003 UT 
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App 287, if if 15-22. Because of this, it is not reasonably likely that 
Defendants would have been acquitted if this issue had been raised. 
Second, even if the instTuction had been given and the case was 
confined to a closed-continuity consh·uct, it is not reasonably likely that 
Defendants would have been acquitted. 
The term "substantial" commonly refers to something that is 
11 important" or II considerable." Merriam-Webster Dictionary, Substantial (2), 
(5) (2005 ed.). Because this concept is relative, the question of whether this 
period of time was substantial was a jury question, and the jury could have 
readily resolved it against Defendants. 
As noted, Tivoli was formed in August 2007, and the checks for 
which they were convicted were written over nine months. R69-78, 971-73; 
Addendum D (checks 1007 & 1070). It is not reasonably likely that the jury 
would have found that a nine-month period of thefts was not" substantial." 
True, the Supreme Court in H.J. Inc. suggested that in a closed-
continuity case, "[p ]redicate acts extending over a few weeks or months and 
threatening no future criminal conduct" · would not "satisfy this 
requirement," 492 U.S. at 242, and the Utah Supreme Court later adopted 
this language in Hill, 2009 UT 28, ,r,r38, 41. 
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But H.J. Inc. did not establish this as an inviolable rule. To the 
contrary, the Court stressed that it would still employ a "flexible approach" 
and that it was "difficult to formulate in the abstract any general test for 
continuity." 492 U.S. at 241. Thus, even after the Court suggested that 
conduct occurring over "a few weeks or months" would not suffice, the 
Court stressed that the "limits of the relationship and continuity concepts 
that combine to define a RICO pattern" "cannot be fixed in advance with 
such clarity that it will always be apparent whether in a particular case a 
pattern of racketeering activity exists." Id. at 243. 
Defendants nevertheless rely on a series of cases suggesting that a 
period does not qualify as substantial unless it extends for multiple years. 
Aplt. Br. at 50. But these decisions run contrary to H.J. Inc., which, again, 
endorsed a "flexible" approach to the question. 492 U.S. at 241. Moreover, 
some federal courts have specifically rejected efforts to impose a set 
require1nent. See, e.g., Allwaste, Inc., 65 F.3d at 1528 (rejecting "a hard and 
fast, bright line, one-year rule," because "such a rigid require1nent" "would 
contradict the fluid concept of continuity enunciated by the Supre1ne Court 
in H.J. Inc."); California Pharmacy Mgmt., LLC v. Zenith Ins. Co., 669 F.Supp.2d 
1152, 1162-63 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (same). 
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In short, neither the United States Supreme Court nor the Utah 
Supreme Court have imposed an inflexible rule of the sort pushed by 
Defendants. Given this, it would have been up to this jury to determine 
whether Defendants' nine-month pattern of thefts sufficed, and on these 
facts, it is not reasonably probable that the jury would have held that it did 
not. This claim accordingly fails. 
VI. 
Defendants' restitution claim is unpreserved and should not 
be reached. 
Defendants argue that the court erred by not taking the terms of the 
civil settlement into account when ordering restitution. Aplt. Br. 53. But 
this issue is unpreserved. 
Before sentencing, Defendants argued that the civil settlement 
"preclude[d]" any restitution. R1077, 135; 1539:6-8. Defendants' claim was 
essentially one of estoppel-that because the Poseys agreed to the 
settlement, they were foreclosed from receiving any restitution in the 
criminal case. See id. 
Defendants were wrong. In State v. Laycock, 2009 UT 53, if 15, 214 P.3d 
104, the supren1e court expressly recognized that the State's ability to 
request restitution as part of a criminal sentence is separate fr01n the 
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victims' actions in a separate civil proceeding. Because of this, the court 
correctly ordered restitution. R1539:22-25. 
On appeal, Defendants do not renew the argument that they made 
below, which, again, was that the civil settlement foreclosed any restitution. 
Aplt. Br. 53-55. Instead, Defendants' argument now is that the restitution 
order should have included an offset for the value that the Poseys received 
in the civil settlement. See id. 
But arguing that the civil settlement prevented the court from 
ordering any restitution is fundamentally different from arguing that the 
civil settle1nent should have been valued and then included in it. Again, 
Defendants did the former, but did not do the latter. This is accordingly an 
unpreserved claim and can be reached only if Defendants demonstrated 
that a preservation exception applies "in [their] opening brief." Oseguera, 
2014 UT 31, ~15. Defendants did not. Aplt. Br. 54-55. This Court 
accordingly should not reach the issue. 
In any event, if this issue is considered, Defendants are wrong when 
they suggest that the court should have accounted for the settlement in 
either its complete or court-ordered restitution orders. Aplt. Br. 54. A 
complete restitution order accounts for "all losses caused by the defendant," 
while a court-ordered restitution order reflects the portion that the court 
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orders the defendant to pay as part of the criminal sentence. Utah Code 
Ann.§ 77-38a-302(2)(a), (2)(b). If Defendants have indeed already paid some 
amount to the Poseys, this would not change either aspect of this- i.e., it 
would not change the overall amount of the Poseys' losses, nor would it 
change the amount that the court believed should be attached to the 
sentence. 
Instead, if the settlement is to now be considered, the place to do so 
would be as a credit in the court's ongoing accounting of how much 
restitution Defendants have actually paid. If this is to be done, however, the 
readjustment must include more than Defendants let on. 
Defendants did not give the Poseys their property back as a 
unilateral, one-way bequest that was intended to compensate the Poseys for 
their losses. Rather, this came as part of negotiated, two-way transaction in 
which Defendants gave the Poseys their property back in exchange for 
$25,000. Addendum D at 1-2. 
If Defendants' end of that transaction is to be counted as restitution -
i.e., as compensation for the harn1 the Poseys suffered from Defendants' 
crimes- then Defendants cannot be allowed to keep the $25,000. Otherwise, 
Defendants would essentially be in the position of charging their victims a 
$25,000 restitution fee. 
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Convicted criminals do not get to charge their victims for the right to 
receive restitution. So if this civil settlement is to counted as restitution, the 
first thing that must happen is that the $25,000 must be taken back from 
Defendants. 
And the adjustment should not stop there. The State asserted below 
that although the Poseys received title to their property back in the 
settlement, their property interests had been damaged in the interim by the 
thefts, and that to stave off foreclosure, the Poseys were forced to negotiate 
a settlement with the hard money lenders that ultimately caused them to 
lose half of their property. R1064-67. 
Defendants want restitution to be offset by the value of the property 
the Poseys received in the civil settlement. But that begs the question of 
how, exactly, to value it. If it is true that the title the Poseys received was 
now comprmnised by a loan that ultimately forced them to lose half their 
property, then that loss must be accounted for when determining how 
much credit to give Defendants. Otherwise, Defendants would be receiving 
credit for giving the Poseys property value that the Poseys never actually 
received. 
Restitution is intended to compensate the victims for "all losses" 
caused by the crimes. Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(2)(a). If Defendants 
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want the civil settlement to be accounted for, both sides of it must be 
included-including the full amount that Poseys lost through that 
settlement. 
But again, Defendants did not raise this argument below. Because 
they did not brief a preservation exception, this issue need not be 
considered. 11 
VIL 
This Court should not reverse for cumulative error 
Finally, Defendants ask for relief for cumulative error. Aplt. Br. 55. 
This Court reverses for cumulative error only if the cumulative effect of 
multiple errors undermines its confidence that the defendant received a fair 
trial. State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35, tjl25, 999 P.2d 7. Here, there was no 
prejudicial error-either individ1.1ally or cumulatively. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
11 In Point V(b), Defendants argue that if any of their convictions are 
reversed, "the portion of the restitution award associated with those counts 
must also be reversed." Aplt. Br. 55. The State agrees. See State v. Larsen, 
2009 UT App 293, tjl6, 221 P.3d 277 (restitution must be based on valid 
conviction or agreement); see also United States v. Camick, 2015 WL 4597562 
(10th Cir., July 31, 2015) (setting aside portion of restitution based on 
overturned convictions). 
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@ 
§ 76-6-404. Theft- Elements 
@ A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over the 
property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
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§ 48-2c-803. Management by members 
In a member-managed company, each member shall be subject to the duties described 
in Section 48-2c-807 and, unless otherwise provided in this chapter, in the articles of 
organization, or an operating agreement: 
(1) the affirmative vote, approval, or consent of members holding a majority of profits 
interests·in the company shall be required to decide any matter connected with the 
business of the company; 
(2) the affirmative vote, approval, or consent of all members shall be required to: 
(a) amend the articles of organization, except to make ministerial amendments 
including: 
(i) amendments made only to reflect actions previously taken with the requisite 
approval, such as a change in managers; or 
(ii) to change an address; 
(b) amend the operating agreement, except to make ministerial amendments, including: 
(i) amendments made only to reflect actions previously taken with the requisite 
approval, such as a change in managers; or 
(ii) to change an address; or 
(c)(i) authorize a member or any other person to do any act on behalf of the company 
that contravenes the articles of organization or operating agreement; and 
(ii) after authorizing an act under Subsection (2)(c)(i) to terminate the authority so 
granted; and 
(3) the affirmative vote, approval, or consent of members holding 2/3 of the profits 
interests in the company shall be required to bind the company to any of the following 
actions: 
(a)(i) authorizing a member or any other person to do any act on behalf of the company 
that is not in the ordinary course of the company's business, or business of the kind 
carried on by the company; and 
(ii) after authorizing an act under Subsection (3)(a)(i) to terminate the authority so 
granted; 
(b) making a current distribution to members; 
(c) resolving any dispute connected with the usual and regular course of the company's 
business; 
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(d) making a substantial change in the business purpose of the company; 
(e) a conversion of the company to another entity; 
(f) a merger in which the company is a party to the merger; 
(g) any sale, lease, exchange, or other disposition of all or substantially all of the 
company's ·property other than in the usual and regular course of the company's 
business; 
(h) any mortgage, pledge, dedication to the repayment of indebtedness, whether with 
or without recourse, or other encumbering of ail or substantially all of the company's 
property other than in the usual and regular course of the company's business; or 
(i) any waiver of a liability of a member under Section 48-2c-603. 
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§ 48-2c-804. Management by managers 
In a manager-managed company, each manager and each member shall be subject 
to Section 48-2c-807 and: 
(l)(a) ~he initial managers shall be designated in the articles of organization; and 
(b) after the initial managers, the managers shall be those persons identified in 
documents filed with the division including: 
(i) amendments to the articles of organization; 
(ii) the annual reports required under Section 48-2c-203; and 
(iii) the statements required or permitted under Section 48-2c-122; 
(2) when there is a change in the management structure from a member-managed 
company to a manager-managed company, the managers shall be those persons 
identified in the certificate of amendment to the articles of organization that makes the 
change; 
(3) each manager who is a natural person must have attained the age of majority under 
the laws of this state; 
(4) no manager shall have authority to do any act in contravention of the articles of 
organization or the operating agreement, except as provided in Subsection (6)(g); 
(5) a manager who is also a member shall have all of the rights of a member; 
(6) unless otherwise provided in the articles of organization or operating agreement of 
the company: 
(a) except for the initial managers, each manager shall be elected at any time by the 
members holding at least a majority of the profits interests in the company, and any 
vacancy occurring in the position of manager shall be filled in the same manner; 
(b) the number of managers: 
(i) shall be fixed by the members in the operating agreement; or 
(ii) shall be the number designated by members holding at least a majority of the profits 
interests in the company if the operating agreement fails to designate the number of 
managers; 
(c) each manager shall serve until the earliest to occur of: 
(i) the manager's death, withdrawal, or removal; 
(ii) an event described in Subsection 48-2c-708(1 )(£); or 
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(iii) if membership in the company is a condition to being a manager, an event 
described in Subsection 48-2c-708(1 )( d) or ( e ); 
(d) a manager need not be a member of the company or a resident of this state; 
(e) any manager may be removed with or without cause by the members, at any time, 
by the decision of members owning a majority of the profits interests in the company; 
(f) there shall be only one class of managers; and 
(g) approval by: 
(i) all of the members and all of the managers shall be required for matters described in 
Subsection 48-2c-803(2); and 
(ii) members holding 2/3 of the profits interests in the company, and 2/3 of the 
managers shall be required for all matters described in Subsection 48-2c-803(3). 
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§ 48-2c-701. Nature of member interest 
~ (1) A member's interest in a company is personal property regardless of the nature of 
the property owned by the company. 
(2) A member has no interest in specific property of a company. 
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REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT 
FOR LAND 
This is a legally binding contract. If you desire legal or tax advice, consult your attorney or tax advisor. 
EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT 
Buyer Equity Partners LLC offers to purchase the Property described below arid hereby delivers to the Brokerage, as 
Earnest Money, the amount of $.5..QQ. in the form of check which, upon Acceptance of this offer by all parties (as defined 
in Section 23), shall be deposited in accordance with state law. 
Received by: [{!ft/) I~ · T oeL{efL co JIT/!-t} t teR.... on __ ....:::8:..._' -"-/i_o_-_e>--=..7 __ (Date) 
(Signature of agent/oroker acknowledges receipt ol Earnest Money) 
Brokerage: -----1/J'----'/'-4-/l--,__ _______ _ 
I 
Phone Number: __ ;1/<........Jf'-'4..L ____ _ 
OFFER TO PURCHASE 
1. PROPERTY: Address 7 C/16/J lo 800 CJ S/telftoe-19 '5;t?A&6--.-5 
Acre: also described as: ...!.T~x~l-='D"-'#~---------------------------
Tax ID # City of Saratoga Springs County of .illab State of Utah, ZIP 8:z'O z's: (the "Property"). 
1.1 Included Items. (specify) _____________________________ _ 
1.2 Water._Bights/Water Shares. The fo llowing y,.,ater. ~ights and/or water shares are included in the Purchase Price. [ ] /. 6 Shares of Stock in the EK lS lt/J C- C-JebL- (Name of Water Company) 
[ ] Other (specify) ---------------------------------
2. PURCHASE PRICE The purchase price for the Property is $3,500,000 
The purchase price will be paid as follows: 
$5.QQ_ (a) Earnest Money Depos it. Under certain conditions described in this Co 
DEPOSIT MAY BECOME TOTALLY NON-REFUNDABLE. 
$3,499,500 (b) New Loa_n. Buyer agrees to apply for one or more of the following loans: 
_. [ ] CONVENTIONAL [ J OTHER (specify) ____________ _ 
If the loan is to include any particular terms, then check below and give details: 
[ ] SPECIFIC l:OAN TERMS ____________ _____ _ 
$ ___ ___ (c) Seller Financing. (see attached Seller Financing Addendum, if applicable) 
$. ___ ___ (d) Other (specify). _____________________ _ 
$ ______ (e) Balance of Purchase Price in Cash at Settlement. 
$3,500.000 PURCHASE PRICE. Total of lines (a) through (e) 
3. SETTLEMENT AND CLOSING. Settlement shall take place on the Settlement Deadline referenced in Section 24(c), or 
on a date upon which Buyer and Seller agree in writing. "Settlement" shall occur only when all of the fo llowing have been 
completed: (a) Buyer and Seller have signed and delivered to each other or to the escrow/closing office all documents 
required by this Contract, by the Lender, by written escrow instructions or by applicable law; (b)any monies require d to be 
paid by Buyer under these documents (except for the proceeds of any new loan) have been delivered by Buyer to Seller 
or to the escrow/closing office in the form of collected or cleared funds ; and (c) any monies required to be paid by Seller 
under these documents have been delivered by Seller to Buyer or to the escrow/closing office in the form of collected or 
• cleared funds. Seller and Buyer shall each pay one-half (½) of the fee charged by tl1e escrow/closing office for its 
services in the settlement/closing process. Taxes and.assessments for the current year, rents. and interest on assumed 
obligations shall be prorated at Settlement as set forth in this Section. Prorations set forth in this Section shall be made as 
of the Settlement Deadline date referenced in Section 24(c), unless otherwise agreed to in writing by the parties. Such 
writing could include· the settlement statement. The transaction wil l be considered closed when Settlement has been 
completed, and when all of the following have been completed: (i) the proceeds of any new loan have been delivered by 
+J-ie Lender to Seller or to the escrow/closing office; and (ii) the applicable Closing documents have been recorded in the 
fice of the county recorder. The actions described in parts (i) and (ii) of the preceding sentence shall be cornpTeted 
·thin four calendar days of Settlement. 
4 . POSSESSION. Seller shall deliv~hysical possession to Buyer within: [ ] Upon Closing [X] Other (specify) .61 
• Reacording ,#.£ sJ'o/o;z 
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·:s: CONFIRMATION OF AG~J.JCY DISCLOSURE. At the signing of this contract: 
. ~1 ] Seller's Initials [ ff{!;, ] Buyer's Initials 
·sting Agent • AJ / /1: represents [ ] Seller [ ] Buyer [ ] both Buyer and Se: 
. ·1; as a Limited --, 
sting Broker for I} Lr;J , represents [ ] Seller [ ] Buyer [ ] both Buyer and Seller 
' (Company Name) as a Limited Agent; 
/J / B represents [ ] Seller [ ] Buyer [ ] both Buyer and Seller 
p h , represents [ ] Seller [ ] Buyer [ ] bo~~ :~;~:1:~t::r~:; 
(Company Name) as a Limited Agent; 
Buyer's Agent 
Buyer's Broker for 
6. TITLE INSURANCE. At Settlement, Seller agrees to pay for a standard-coverage owner's policy of title insurance 
insuring Buyer in the amount of the Purchase Price. Any additional title insurance coverage shall be at Buyer's expense. 
7. SELLER DISCLOSURES. No later than the Seller Disclosure Deadline referenced in Section 24(a), Seller shall provide 
to Buyer the following documents which are collectively referred to as the "Seller Disclosures11 : 
(a} a Seller property condition disclosure for the Property, signed and dated by Seller; 
(b) a commitment for the policy of title insurance: 
(c) a copy of any leases affecting the Property not expiring prior to Closing; 
(d) written notice of any claims and/or conditions known to Seller relating to environmental problems; 
(e) evidence of any water rights and/or water shares referenced in Section 1.2 above; and (f) Other (specify) ___________________________ _ 
8. BUYER'S RIGHT TO CANCEL BASED ON BUYER'S DUE DILIGENCE. Buyer's obligation to purchase under this 
Contract (check applicable boxes}: 
(a} [X] IS [ ] IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of the content of all the Seller Disclosures referenced in 
Section 7; 
(b) [X] IS [ ] IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of a physical condition inspection of the Property; 
(c) [X] IS [ ] IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of a survey of the Property by a licensed surveyor; 
(d) [X] IS [ ] IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of applicable federal, state and local governmental laws, 
•dinances and regulations affecting the Property; and any applicable deed restrictions and/or CC&R's ( covenants, 
Jnditions and restrictions) affecting the Property; 
(e) [X] 1s· [ ] 1s· NOT conditioned upon the Property appraising for not less than the Purchase Price; 
(f) [X] IS [ ] IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of the terms and conditions of any mortgage financing 
referenced in Section 2 above; 
(g) [ ] IS [ ] IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of the following tests and evaluations of the Property: (specify) 
If any of items 8(a) through 8(g) are checKed in the affirmative, then Sections 8.1, 8.2, 8.3 and 8.4 apply; otherwise, they 
do not apply. The items checked in the affirmative above are collectively referred to as Buyer's "Due Diligence." Unless 
otherwise provided in this Contract, Buyer's Due Diligence shall be paid for by Buyer and shall be conducted by 
individuals or entities of Buyer's choice. Seller agrees to cooperate with Buyer's Due Diligence and with a final pre-closing 
inspection under Section 11. 
8.1 Due Diligence Deadline. No later than the Due Diligence Deadline referenced in Section 24(b) Buyer shall: (a) 
complete all qf Buyer's Due Diligence; and (b) determine if the results of Buyer's Due Diligence are acceptable to Buyer. 
8.2 Right to Cancel or Object. If Buyer determines that the results of Buyer's Due Diligence are unacceptable, Buyer 
may, no later than the Due Diligence Deadline, either: (a) cancel this Contract by providing written notice to Seller, 
whereupon the Earnest Money Deposit shall be released to Buyer; or (b) provide Seller with written notice of objections. 
8.3 Failure to Respond. If by the expiration of the Due Diligence Deadline, Buyer does not: (a) cancel this Contract 
as provided in Section 8.2; or (b) deliver a written objection to Seller regarding the Buyer's Due Diligence, The Buyer's 
Due Diligence shall be deemed approved by Buyer; and the contingencies referenced in Sections B(a) through B(g), 
including but not limited to, any financing contingency, shall be deemed waived by Buyer. 
8.4 Response by Seller. If Buyer provides written objections to Seller, Buyer and Seller shall have seven calendar 
days after Seller's receipt of Buyer's objections {the 11 Response Period") in which to agree in writing upon the manner of 
solving Buyer's objections. Except as provided in Section 10.2, Seller may, but shall not be required to, resolve Buyer's 
,jections. If Buyer and Seller have not agreed in writing upon the manner of resolving Buyer's objections, Buyer may 
.. -'ncel this Contract by providing written notice to Seller no later than three calendar days after expiration of the Response 
Period; whereupon the Earnest Money Deposit shall be released to Buyer. If this Contract is not canceled by Buyer under 
this Section 8.4, Buyer's objecti~med waiv:9 by puyer. This waiver shall not affect those items warranted 
in Section 10. T;, %/ltJ / (} -9-
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·. 9. ADDITIONAL TERMS. There [X] ARE [ ] ARE NOT addenda to this Contract containing additional terms. If there 
-=i.re, the terms of the following addenda are incorporated into this Contract by this reference: [X] Addenda No.'s 1 [ ] 
,ell~r Financing Addendum [ ] Other (specify) _____________________ _ 
10. SELLER WARRANTIES AND REPRESENTATIONS. 
10.1 Condition of Title. Seller represents that Seller has fee title to the Property and will convey good and marketable 
title to Buyer at Closing by general warranty deed. Buyer agrees, however, to accept title to the Property subject to the 
following matters of record: easements, deed restrictions, CC&R's (meaning covenants, conditions and restrictions), and 
rights-of-way; and subject to the contents of the Commitment for Title Insurance as agreed to by Buyer under Section 8. 
Buyer also agrees to take the Property subject to existing leases affecting the Property and not expiring prior to Closing. 
Buyer agrees to be responsible for taxes, assessments, homeowners association dues, utilities, and other services 
provided to the Property· after Closing. Seller will cause to be paid off by Closing all mortgages, trust deeds, judgments, 
mechanic's liens, tax liens and warrants. Seller will cause to be paid current by Closing all assessments and homeowners 
association dues. 
IF ANY PORTION OF THE PROPERTY IS PRESENTLY ASSESSED AS 11 GREENBEL T" (CHECK APPLICABLE 
BOX): 
[X] SELLER [ ] BUYER SHALL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR PAYMENT OF ANY ROLL-BACK TAXES ASSESSED 
AGAINST THE PROPERTY. 
10.2 Condition of Property. Seller warrants that the Property will be in the following condition ON THE DATE 
SELLER DELIVERS PHYSICAL POSSESSION TO BUYER: 
(a) the Property shall be free of debris and personal property; 
(b) the Property will be in the same general condition as it was on the date of Acceptance. 
~ 11. FINAL PRE-CLOSING INSPECTION. Before Settlement, Buyer may, upon reasonable notice and at a reasonable 
time, conduct a final pre-closing inspection of the Property to determine only that the Property is "as represented," 
meaning that the Property has been repaired/corrected as agreed to in Seotion 8.4, and is in the condition warranted in 
Section 10.2. If the Property is not as represented, Seller will, prior to Settlement, repair/correct the Property, and place 
the Property in the warranted condition or with the consent of Buyer (and Lender if applicable), escrow an amount at 
Settlement sufficient to provide for the same. The failure to conduct a final pre-closing inspection or to claim that the 
~ r:>roperty is not as represented, shall not constitute a waiver by Buyer of the right to receive, on the date of possession, the 
·operty as represented. 
12. CHANGES DURING TRANSACTION. Seller agrees that from the date of Acceptance until the date of Closing, none 
of the following shall occur without the prior written consent of Buyer: (a) no changes in any existing leases shall be made; 
(b) no new leases shall be entered into; (c) no substantial alterations or improvements to the Property shall be made or 
undertaken; and (d) no further financial encumbrances affecting the Property shall be made. 
@ 13. AUTHORITY OF SIGNERS. If Buyer or Seller is a corporation, partnership, trust, estate, limited liability company or 
other entity, the person executing this Contract on its behalf warrants his or her authority to do so and to bind Buyer and 
Seller. 
14. COMPLETE CONTRACT. This Contract together with its addenda, any attached exhibits, and Seller Disclosures, 
constitutes the entire Contract between the parties and supersedes and replaces any and all prior negotiations, 
~ representations, warranties, understandings or contracts between the parties. This Contract cannot be changed except by 
written agreement of the parties. 
15. DISPUTE RESOLUTION. The parties agree that any dispute, arising prior to or after Closing, related to this Contract 
{check applicable box) 
[ ] SHALL 
[X] MAY AT THE OPTION OF THE PARTIES 
Qo first be submitted to mediation. If the parties agree to mediation, the dispute shall be submitted to mediation through a 
mediation provider mutually agreed upon by the parties. Each party agrees to bear its own costs of mediation. If mediation 
fails, the other procedures and remedies available under this Contract shall apply. Nothing in this Section 15 shall prohibit 
any party from seeking emergency equitable relief pending mediation. 
(j 
16. DEFAULT. If Buyer defaults, Seller may elect either to retain the Earnest Money Deposit as liquidated damages, or to 
return it and sue Buyer to specifically enfor~e this Contract or pursue other remedies available at law. If Seller defaults, in 
idition to return of the Earnest Money Deposit, Buyer may elect either to accept from Seller a sum equal to the Earnest 
1oney Deposit as liquidated damages, or may sue Seller to specifically enforce this Contract or pursue other remedies 
,ailable at law. If Buyer elects to accept liquidated damages, Seller agrees to pay the liquidated damages to Buyer upon 
demand. 
Ci )1'-/0 --o 9 
17. ATTORNEY FEES AND CO~TS. t e nt of. liti_aation or binding arbitration to enforce. this Contract, the prevailing 
Page 3 of 5 pages Seller's Initials Date S--/47· tJ /2uyer's Initials__/}_/!) Date /!3''---(t)- 0 / Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
· • cp~rty shall be entitled to costs and reasonable attorney fees. However, attorney fees shall not be awarded for participation • 
, in mediation under Section 15. 
S. NOTICES. Except as provided in Section 23, all notices required under this Contract must be: (a) in writing; (b) signed 
•JY the party giving notice; and (c) received by the other party or the other party's agent no later than the applicable date 
iferenced in this Contract. 
19. ABROGATION. Except for the provisions of Sections 10.1, 10.2, 15 and 17 and express warranties made in this 
Contract, the provisions of this Contract shall not apply after Closing. 
20. RISK OF LOSS. All risk of loss to the Property, including physical damage or destruction to the Property or its 
improvements due to any cause except ordinary wear and tear and loss caused by a taking in eminent domain, shall be 
borne by Seller until the transaction is closed. 
21. TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE. Time is of the essence regarding the dates set forth in this Contract. Extensions must be 
agreed to in writing by all parties. Unless otherwise explicitly-stated in this Contract: (a) performance under each Section 
of this Contract which references a date shall absolutely be required by 5:00 PM Mountain Time on the stated date; and 
(b) the term ndays" shall mean calendar days and shall be counted beginning on the day following the event which triggers 
the timing requirement (i.e., Acceptance, etc.). Performance dates and times referenced herein shall not be binding upon 
title companies, lenders, appraisers and others not parties to this Contract, except as otherwise agreed to in writing by 
such non-party. 
22. FAX TRANSMISSION AND COUNTERPARTS. Facsimile (fax) transmission of a signed copy of this Contract, any 
addenda and counteroffers, and the retransmission of any signed fax shall be the same as delivery of an original. This 
Contract and any addenda and counteroffers may be executed in counterparts. 
23. ACCEPTANCE. "Acceptance" occurs when Seller or Buyer, responding to an offer or counteroffer of the other: (a) 
signs the offer or counteroffer where noted to indicate acceptance; and (b) communicates to the othe~ party or to the other 
party's agent that the offer or counteroffer has been signed as required. 
_24. CONTRACT DEADLINES. Buyer and Seller agree that the following deadlines shall apply to this Contract: 
(a) Seller Disclosure Deadline 
,) Due Diligence Deadline 
(c) Settlement Deadline 
-----"8"-----_I_S-_..-_o_? __ (Date) 
__ _.__;8::;...._-_j__o_-_o_7 ____ (Date) 
!5•- 2 a - C3 7 
___ --4:a..,.-__ 0 _________ (Date) 
25. OFFER AND TIME FOR ACCEPTANCE. Buyer offers to purchase the Property on the above terms and conditions. If 
Seller does not accept this offer by: _____ [ ] AM [ ] PM Mountain Time on __________ (Date), 
this offer shall lapse; and the Brokerage shall return the Earnest Money Deposit to Buyer. 
/ltfl1h-~11~ .. 
(Buyer's Signature) (Offer Date) (Buyer's Signature) (Offer Date) 
The later of the above Offer Dates shall be referred to as the "Offer Reference Date" 
Equity Partners LLQ GoS /) Li?;G /jJ c.e-M#Jffe ffl/f __ ~_l_-_z0_g-7&. 
(Buyers' Names) (PLEASE PRINT) (Notice Address) (Zip Code) (Phone) 
»dP S-/(hJ7 
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ACCEPTANCE/COUNTEROFFER/REJECTION 
. ~HECK ONE: 
i. ] ACCEPTANCE OF OFFER TO PURCHASE: Seller Accepts the foregoing offer on the terms and conditions specified 
':love. 
[ ] COUNTEROFFER: Seller presents for Buyer1s Acceptance the terms of Buyer's offer subject to the exceptions or 
modifications as specified in the attached ADDENDUM NO. ____ _ 
(Seller's Signature) {Date) {Time) (Seller1s Signature) {Date) (Time) 
(Sellers' Names} (PLEASE PRINT) ·(Notice Address} (Zip Code) (Phone) 
[ ] REJECTION: Seller rejects the foregoing offer. 
. (Seller1s Signature) (Date) (Time) (Seller's Signature) {Date) (Time) 
This form is COPYRIGHTED by the UTAH ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS® for use solely by its members. Any unauthorized use, 
modification, copying or distribution without written consent is prohibited. NO REPRESENTATION IS MADE AS TO THE LEGAL 
VALIDITY OR ADEQUACY OF ANY PROVISION OF THIS FORM IN ANY SPECIFIC TRANSACTION. IF YOU DESIRE SPECIFIC LEGAL OR 
TAX ADVICE, CONSULT AN APPROPRIATE PROFESSIONAL 
COPYRIGHT© UTAH ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS® - 7.8.04 - ALL RIGHTS RESERVED UAR FORM 19 
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ADDENDUM NO. 1 
TO 
REAL EST ATE PURCHASE CONTRACT 
THIS IS AN [X] ADDENDUM [ ] COUNTEROFFER to that REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT (the "REPC") with 
an Offer J3eference Date of 8- /P. - O 7 including all prior addenda and counteroffers, between 
Ettt&:r' //flltptgt.s ac · as Buyert and lhobbte l'es~f: lte/J K<:4-t hsc;z:: as Seller, 
regarding the Property located at ___________________________ The 
following terms are hereby incorporated as part of the REPC: 
1- Purchase price of property is based on city approval of ·conceptual plan for· Rezoneing _to R-3 
with 20% density bounus. 
2- Purchase price of property is based on city approval of conceptual plan for rezo~ing 4-5 acres of 
property along Redwood Road to commercial/mixed use. 
3- Subject to legal review. 
BUYER AND SELLER AGREE THAT THE CONTRACT DEADLINES REFERENCED IN SECTION 24 OF THE REPC 
{CHECK APPLICABLE BOX): ~ REMAIN UNCHANGED [ J ARE CHANGED AS FOLLOWS: ______ _ 
To the extent the terms of this ADDENDUM modify or conflict with any provisions of the REPC, including all prior addenda 
and counteroffers, these terms shall control. All other terms of the REPC, including all prior addenda and counteroffers, 
not modified by this ADDENDUM shall remain the same. [ ] Seller [ ] Buyer shall have until ____ [ ] AM [ ] PM 
Mountain Time on ___________ (Date), to accept the terms of this ADDENDUM in accordance with 
the provisions of Section 23 of the REPC. Unless so accepted, the offer as set forth in this ADDENDUM shall lapse. 
&11.f 
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~ CHECK ONE: 
~CCEPTANCE: P( Seller [ ] Buyer hereby accepts the terms of this ADDENDUM. 
[ ] COUNTEROFFER: [ ] Seller [ ] Buyer presents as a counteroffer the terms of attached ADDENDUM NO. __ _ 
(Signature) (Date) {Time) (Signature) (Date) (Time) 
[ ] REJECTION: [ ] Seller [ ] Buyer rejects the foregoing ADDENDUM. 
(Signature) (Date) (Time) (Signature) (Date) (Time) 
THIS FORM APPROVED BY THE UT AH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION AND THE OFFICE OF THE UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL, 
\4iJ EFFECTIVE AUGUST 5, 2003. IT REPLACES AND SUPERSEDES ALL PREVIOUSLY APPROVED VERSIONS OF THIS FORM. 
_ .. .... ll/1/J 
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ADDENDUM NO. 2 
TO 
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT 
Pagel of 2 
THIS IS AN [X] ADDENDUM [ ] COUNTEROFFER to that REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT (the 11 REPC11) with 
a,u0ffer Refe:9ince?ate of ____________ including all prior addenda and counteroffers, between 
t:g, J rb t::~~ 1 l LC as Buyer, and -.....-----r----=-----~-:---:-----:::--:-,~":'"":",: as Seller, 
regarding the Property located at7£Jlto ND· (0$oc) LJ.). , cSa.rnf~o. ~YiYljS• Ut S',0Lf5 . The 
following terms are hereby incorporated as part of the REPC: 
IT IS AGREED BETWEEN THE SELLER AND BUYER AS FOLLOWS: 
o oses to lat and subdiv· de the r ert which is the sub· ect of this A reement accordin to 
SUBDIVISION for the entire parcel. 
2. Fulfillment of this offer to purchase is contingent on Buyer determining to his sole satisfaction that the 
project is .economically feasible. 
3. In the event Buyer determines the project is not feasible for any reason then the Earnest Money 
accompanying this Agreement Will revert to Buyer unless other arrangements are agreed between the Buyer 
and Seller. Buyer will also provide all the product of his work on the site to date but at no cost to the Seller and 
this Agreement will be deemed null and void. 
4. In the event governmental approvals are still pending and imminent upon expiration of the time period noted 
in the Purchase and Sale Agreement, then closing for the Agreement will be automatically extended for a period 
of /l::0 days. 
5 Seller agrees to join with Buyer in the proceedings and in the execution of any petitions, plats or dedications 
which may be required for development of the realty but at no expense to the Seller. 
6. Seller grants permission for the Buyer or his representative to enter onto the property for the purpose of soil 
tests, surveying and all those studies necessary to prepare the realty for development. 
7. Buyer hereby indemnifies and saves Seller harmless from any liens or accidents that may arise because of· 
Buyer's activity on the land. 
8. Seller warrants the property which is the subject of this Agreement is free of hazardous wastes and has never 
heen used as a toxic waste dump of any kind. In the event hazardous wastes are discovered on the site Buyer 
may abandon the project and all Earnest Money will be returned to Buyer. 
9. In the event unusable wetlands are found to exist on the site, those identified wetlands plus buffer areas will 
be deducted from the purchase price on a per square foot basis. 
ALL THE OTHER TERMS AND CONDITIONS of the Agreement remain unchanged. 
BUYER AND SELLER AGREE THAT THE CONTRACT DEADLINES REFERENCED IN SECTION 24 OF THE REPC 
(CHECK APPLICABLE BOX): [Xl REMAIN UNCHANGED [ ] ARE CHANGED AS FOLLOWS: ______ _ 
To the extent the terms of this ADDENDUM modify or conflict with any provisions of the REPC, including all prior addenda 
and counteroffers, these terms shall control. All other terms of the REPC, including all prior addenda and counteroffers, 
not modified by this ADDENDUM shall remain the same. [ ] Seller [ ] Buyer shall have until ____ ( ] AM [ ] PM 
Mountain Time on ____________ (Date), to accept the terms of this ADDENDUM in accordance with 
the provisions of Section 23 of the REPC. Unless so accepted, the offer as set forth in this ADDENDUM shall lapse. 
Page 1 of 2 ,!,(seller's lnitials/rfle_ !liieers Initials ~ X Addendum No. 2 to REPC Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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X 
j B'uyer [ ] Seller Signature 
CHECK ONE: 
(Date) (Time) [ ] Buyer [ ] Seller Signature 
ACCEPTANCE/COUNTEROFFER/REJECTION 
[ ] ACCEPTANCE: [ ] Seller [ ] Buyer hereby accepts the terms of this ADDENDUM. 
(Date) (Time) 
[ ] COUNTEROFFER: ( ] Seller [ ] Buyer presents as a counteroffer the terms of attached ADDENDUM NO. __ _ 
(Signature) (Date) (Time) (Signature) (Date) (Time) 
[ ] REJECTION: [ ] Seller [ ] Buyer r~jects the foregoing ADDENDUM. 
(Signature) (Date) (Time) (Signature) (Date) (Time) 
THIS FORM APPROVED BY THE UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION AND THE OFFICE OF THE UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL, 
EFFECTIVE AUGUST 5, 2003. IT REPLACES AND SUPERSEDES ALL PREVIOUSLY APPROVED VERSIONS OF THIS FORM. 
Page 2 of 2 Seller"s Initials KRP ec;tl .f-ye(s lnitials_/}J!J_ Addendum No. 2 to REPC 
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SELLER ~INANCING ADDENDUM 
TO 
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT 
THIS SELLER FINANCING ADDENDUM is made a part of that REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT (the •REPC1 
with an Offer Reference Date of August 10. 2007, between EQuity Partners, LLC as Buyer, and Kerry and 
Bobbie Posey as Seller, regarding the Property located at 7916 N 10800 N Saratoga Springs 84045- The tenns 
of this ADDENDUM are hereby incorporated as part of the REPC. 
1. CREDIT DOCUMENTS. Seller's extension of credit to Buyer shall be evidenced by: [X] Note and Deed of Trust [ ] 
Note and All-Inclusive Deed of Trust [ ] Other: ______________________ _ 
2. CREDIT TERMS. The tenns of the credit documents referred to in Section 1 above am as follows: 
$2,750,000 principal amount of the note (the •Note•); interest at il°k per annum; payable at approximately $.Q per Q. The 
entire unpaid balance of principal plus accrued interest is due in 12 months from date of the Note. First payment due 12. 
months. Additional principal payments. balloon payments or other terms as follows: 
The credit documents referenced in Section 1 of this ADDENDUM will •contain a due-on-sale clause in favor of Seller. 
Seller agrees to provide to Buyer at Settlement: (a) an amortization schedule based on the above terms; (b) a written 
disclosure of the total interest Buyer will pay to maturity of the Note; and (c) the annual percentage rate on the Note based 
on loan closing costs. 
3. TAXES AND ASSESSMENTS. In addition to the payments referenced in Section 2 above, Buyer shall also be 
responsible for: (a) property truces; {b) homeowners association dues; (c) special assessments; and {d) hazard insurance 
premiums on the Property. These obligations will be paid: [ ] directly to Seller/Escrow Agent on a monthly basis [X] 
directly to the applicable county treasurer, association, and Insurance company as required by those entities. 
4. PAYMENT. Buyers payments under Sections 2 and 3 above will be made to: [X] Setler [ ] an Escrow Agent If an 
Escrow Agent, ______________ will act as Escrow Agent and will be responsible for disbursing 
payments on any underlying mortgage or deed of trust (the •underlying mortgage•) and to the Seller. Cost of setting up 
the escrow account shall be paid by: [ ] Buyer [ ] Seller [X] split evenly between the parties. 
5. LATE PAYMENT/PREPAYMENT. Any payment not made within .0. days after it is due is subject to a late charge of $.Q 
or .il°k of the installment due, which~ver is greater. Amounts in defauH shall bear interest at a rate of .il°k per annum. All or 
part of the principal balance on the Note may be paid prior to maturity without penally. 
6. DUE-ON-SALE. As part of the Seller Disclosures referenced in Section 7 of the REPC, SeDer shall pJQvide to Buyer a 
copy of the underlying mortgage, the note secured thereby, and the amortization schedule. Buyer's obligation to purchase 
under this Contract is conditioned upon Buye(s approval of the content of those documents, in accordance with Section 8 
of the REPC. If the holder of the underlying mortgage calls the loan due as a result of 1hls transaction. Buyer agrees to 
discharge the underlying loan as required by the mortgage lender. In such event. Seller's remaining equity shall be paid 
as provided in the credit documents. 
7. BUYER DISCLOSURES. Buyer has provided to Seller, as a required part of this ADDENDUM, the attached Buyer 
Financial Information Sheet. Buyer may use the Buyer Financial Information Sheet approved by the Real Estate 
Commission and the Attorney General's Office, or may provide comparable written information in a different format, 
together with such additional infonnation as Seller may reasonably require. Buyer [X] WILL· [ ] WILL NOT provide 
Seller with copies of IRS returns for the two preceding tax years. Buyer acknowledges that Seller may contact Buyers 
current employer for verification of employment as represented by Buyer in the Buyer Financial lnfonnation Sheet 
8. SELLER APPROVAL By the Seller Disclosure Deadline referenced in Section 24(b) of the REPC, Buyer shall provide 
to SeUer, at Buyers expense, a current credit report on Buyer from a consumer crecftt reporting agency. Seller may use 
the creolt report and the information referenced in Section 7 of this Addendum (•Buyer Disclosures") to evaluate the credit 
worthiness of Buyer. 
8.1 Seller Review. By the Evaluations & Inspections Deadline referenced in Section 24(c) of the REPC, Seller shall 
review the credit report and the Buyer Disclosures to determine if the content of the credit report and the Buyer 
Disclosures, is acceptable. If the content of the credit report or the Buyer Disclosures is not acceptable to Seller, Seller 
may elect to either: (a) provide written objections to Buyer as provided in Section 8.2 of this ADDENDUM; or (b) 
immediately cancel the REPC by providing written notice to Buyer by the Evaluations & Inspections Deadline referenced 
in Section 24(c) of the REPC. The Brokerage, upon receipt of a copy of Seller's written ~ of cancellation, shall return 
Page 1 of 2 pages Saller"s lnffials flJr'...£ Date ______ Buyer's lnitials __ fW ____ Date _____ _ 
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to Buyar the Earnest Money Dspostt. 
a.2 Selle; Objections. If Seller does not immediately cancel the REPC as provide.~ ~ve, Sel~~r mar, by tha 
Evaluations & Inspections Deadline reierenced in Seciion 24(c) of the REPC, provide Buyer wffil written objections. Buyer 
and SeJJer shall have se\--an ca;sitdai days arter Buyers receipt of the objections (the •Response PeriodQ) ·1n which to 
agree in wrtttng upon the manner oi resoiving Seiters objections. Buyer may7 but shall not be required to, resolve Sellers 
objections .. If Selle; and Buyer have not agraad in wming upon the manna; of rasoMng ·Seller's objections, Sellar may 
cancel the REPC by providing written notice to Buyer no iater than three caiendar days after expiration of me Response 
Period. The Brokerage, u-pan rtn;eipt of a copy of SaDars written notice of Ccu'n,-ellation. shall rstum to Buyer the Eamsst 
Money Deposit 
3.3 Fallura to Object. If SeUei does not dalrv13i a written objection to Btrfai regarding the credit report or a Buyer 
Oisciosure by the EvaJuations & inspections Deadline referenced in Section 24(cj <ri the REPC or cancel the REPC as 
provided in Sections S. i Oi 8.2 of ttds ADDENDUM, the ciedlt raport and Buyer Disclosut-es will be deemad approved by 
Seller. ' 
9. TITtE iNSURANCE. Buyer [ ] SHALL [X] SHALL NOT provide to Seller a lender's policy of title insurance in 1he 
amount of the indebtedness to the Seller, and shall pay for such pollcy at Settlement. 
'10.. D;SCLOSURE OF TAX ID2NTIFICATICN NUMBERS. By no latai than So-ttlamant Buyer and SaHer shall disclose to 
each other their respacii-,;e Social Sacumy Numbara or othar applicable tax idantification numbers so that they may 
comply with iederal laws on reporting mortgage interest in ffiings wiih ihe tnternai Revenue Service. 
To the extent the tenns of this ADDENDUM modify oi conflict with any provisions of tha REPC, including all prior addenda 
and counteroffeiS, these terms shaJI control. All othei tenns of the REPC, including all prior addenda and counteroffers, 
not modified by this ADDENDUM shall remain the same. (X] Seller [ ] Buyer shall have until ~=00 [ ] AM [}ll PM 
Mouniain Time on Noyemhe; 12, 2007 (Datej, to accept the terms of this SELLER FINANCING ADDENDUM in 
accordance with the provisions of Section 23 of the REPC. Unless so accepted, the offer as set forth in this SELLER 
FINANCING AD~~UM shaft lapse. f/fJt- . I 1$ /111P}~ E~ac:f'( #f/£1,0e,Q__s, 
£56 Buyer [ j Selier Signature (Daie) 
[ ] Bt.ryer [ J Seller Signature (Date) 
..L • t 11meJ 
(Time) 
Sociai Security Number 
Soci.at Security Number 
CHECK ONE: 
!)d ACCEPTANCE: p(Selier [ ] Buyer hereby accepts ihe terms oi ihis ADDENDUM. 
[ J CoUNTEP.OFFJiR: f J Se!!er f ] Sia-ye; presents as a counteroffer.the terms of attached ADDENDUM NO. __ _ 
/;iu_~. /,l ·f!~ . . ~ /< ;2 
(Signature) (Date) (Time) e) (Tune) 
[ ] REJECTION: [ ] Seller [ ] Buyer rejects the foregoing SELLER FINANCING 
{Signature} (Date} {Time) {Signature) (Date) {!ime} 
rn;s ;:~ ~\.-ED 3\'Ttt:: t-"TA~ ~::A:. f:STATE CO~~ A.".!n reE OffiCE a!= '!HE L'TA.~ A~EY GE!-!EP.AL, 
crrcCTrw~ AUGUST 17, 1ssa. rr ~l:PtACES :U~:} SUPERSECES AU.. ~~F.":OUS:.. ': AP:>00\'ED V:;RSSO!'.:S Of" TH:$ :=o~~-
Date. ______ _ 
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ADDENDUM NO. :J 
TO 
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT 
Page_/_of I 
THIS IS AN [)<] ADDENDUM r ] COUNTEROFFER to that REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT (the "REPC11) with 
an Offer Reference Date of </ - IO - 0 1 , including all prior addenda nd counteroffers, between 
~qUt·~ P~ , LL c...... as Buyer, and ~c @-cr-6--6-r--e.. ,.......,L.'"'~/ as Seller, 
regarding th Property located at ' t q f <; ~ /0 <?On 1 / . ;/ ""- ei ,. /, , ~o V f. The 
following terms are hereby incorporated as part of the REPC: · · · ~i 
BUYER AND SELLER AGREE THAT THE CONTRACT DEADLINES REFERENCED IN SECTION 24 OF THE REPC 
(CHECK ~PPLICABLE BOX): [ ] REMAIN UNCHANGED _!>¥ARE CHANGED AS FOLLOWS: ______ _ 
-2, L( .. C =- 11 I ll I o 1 
. I I 
To the extent the terms of this ADDENDUM modify or conflict with any provisions of the REPC, including all prior addenda 
and counteroffers, these terms shall control. All other terms of the REPC, including all prior addenda and counteroffers, 
not modified by this ADDENDUM shall remain the same. [x1 Seller [ ] Buyer shall have until s- ~ 0-0 [ ] AM [.:><}_PM 
Mountain Time on I I /1 >-- I o 7 (Date), to accept the terms of this ADDENDUM in accordance with the 
provisions of Section 23 of the REPC. Unless so accepted, the offer as set forth in this ADDENDUM shall lapse. 
11@:~ J)(} Buyer [ ] Seller Signature (Date) (Time) [ ] Buyer [ ] Seller Signature (Date) (Time) 
ACCEPTANCE/COUNTEROFFER/REJECTION 
CHECK ONE: P<J ACCEPTANCE: [WSeller [ ] Buyer hereby accepts the terms of this ADDENDUM. 
] Seller [ ] Buyer presents as a counteroffer the terlJlS of attached ADDENDUM NO. __ . 
(Date} (Time) {Time) 
[ ] REJECTION: [ ] Seller [ ] Buyer rejects the foregoing ADDENDUM. 
{Signature) (Date) (Time) (Signature) (Date) (Time) 
THIS FORM APPROVED BY THE UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION AND THE OFFICE OF THE UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL, 
EFFECTIVE AUGUST 5, 2003. IT REPLACES AND SUPERSEDES ALL PREVIOUSLY APPROVED VERSIONS OF THIS FORM. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ADDENDUM NO. L/ 
TO REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT 
ADDENDUM ( ) to reference date of 8-10-07 between Equity 
Partners,LLC(names) 6118/l/ d&tl;v;: Jflrc)es D1ctr1cksi?Jt1 
tlu.Y fl17c/ers:ao, tl/Jt.dtm1c fYanrn , 
J 
____________________ as buyers. Kerry R 
and Bobbie M Posey as SELLERS. The following terms are hereby 
incorporated as part of the REPC: 
l. Addendum# 3 is solely for ~btaining a loan from money people. (Len da,es) 
2. Purchase price remains at $3,500,000 for 29 plus acres and buildings. 
Payoff is to be distributed as follows ..... 
Kerry to receive$ I 000 weekly, Bobbie to receive $1500 weekly. 
Commencing 0¼ w.a.-~ ~-ft~ Cle~.,,._~. 
$_1_ac_· o_,_G_o_o ___ to be received at Hard fvloney after entitlement. 
House and barn to be vacated by / s- d':::i/,l- a...f/.e-,,,- .,,)A-7,r ( l-<7 ~ 
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A.-Settlement Statement U.S. Department of Housing 
and Urban Development 
0MB No. 2502-026~ 
B. Tvoe of Loan 
I. 0 FHA 2. • FmHA 3. • Conv Unins 
4. D VA 5. • Conv Ins. 6. D Seller Finance 
6. File Number 
0715783-MN 
7. Loan Number 8. Mortgage Ins Case Number 
C. Note: This fonn is furnished to give you a statement of actual settlement costs. Amounts paid to and by the settlement agent are shown. Items marked 
"(o.o.c.)" were oaid outside the closine: they are shown here for informationaJ pumoscs and are not included in the totals. 
D. Name & Address of Borrower E. Name & Address of Seller F. Name & Address of Lender 
Equity Partners LLC Kerry Roger Posey and Bobbie Marie Posey K E Capital Services 
G. Property Localion 
7916 North 10800 West Saratoga Springs. UT 84045 
7916 North 10800 West 
Saratoga Springs, UT 84045 
J. Summary of Borrower's Transaction 
JOO Gross Amount Due from Borrower 
IO J. Contract Sales Price 
J 02. Personal Property 
103. SelUement Charges lo borrower 
ln,t 
JJ6. 
120. Gross Amount Due From Borrower 
200. Amounts Paid By Or io Behalf Of Borrower 
201. Deposit or earnest money 
202. PrincipaJ amount of new loan(s) 
203. Existing loan{s) taken subject to 





209. SELLER CARRY BACK 
Adjustments for items unpaid by seller 
2 IO. County Property Taxes 01/01/07 thru 11/16/07 
211. Assessment Truces 








220. Total Paid Bv/For Borrower 
JOO. Cash At Settlement FromfTo Borrower 
301. Gross Amount due from borrower {line 120) 
302. Less amounts paid by/for borrower (line 220) 












Section 5 of the Real Estate Sclllement Procedures Act (RESPA) requires the 
following: • HUD must develop a Special lnfonnalion Booklet to help persons 
borrowing money to finance the purchase of residential real estate lo better 
understand the nature and costs of real estate settlement services; 
• Each lender must provide the booklet to all applicants from whom ii receives 
or for whom it prepares a written application to borrow money to finance the 
purchuse of residential real estate; • Lenders must prepare :md distribute with 
the Booklet a Good Faith Estimate of the settlement costs that the borrower is 
7240 South Highland Drive #200 
Snit Lake City, UT 84121 
1-1. Settlement Agent Name 
Premier Title Insurance Agency Inc. 
7240 S Highland Dr Ste 200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84121 Tax ID: 87-0671335 
Place or Settlement 
Premier Title Insurance Agency Inc. 
7240 S Highland Dr #200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84121 
K. Summary of Seller's Transaction 
400. Gross Amount Due to Seller 
401. Contract Sales Price 




420. Gross Amount Due to Seller 
500. Reductions in Amount Due to Seller 
50 I. Excess Deposit 
502. Settlement Charges to Seller (line I 400) 
503. Existing Loan{s) Taken Subject to 
504. Payoff of first mortgage loan 
505. Payoff of second mortgage loan 
506. PAYOFF 1ST MORTGAGE 
507. PAYOFF 2ND MORTGAGE 
508. 2007 TAXES 
509. SELLER CARRY BACK 
Adjustments for items unpaid by seller 
510. County Property Taxes 01/01/07 thru I 1 /1 6/07 
511. Assessment Taxes 








520. Total Reduction Amount Due Seller 
600. Cnsh At Scttlemen~ To/From Seller 
60 I. Gross Amount due to seller (line 420) 
602. Less reductions in amt. due seller (line 520) 
603. Cash To Seller 












$3, I 07,508. 77 
S3,500,000.00 
$3, I 07,508. 77 
$392,491.23 
Section 4(a) or RESPA mandates that I IUD develop and prescribe this standard 
form to be used at the time of loan settlement to provide full disclosure or all 
charges imposed upon the borrower and seller. These are third party disclosures 
that are designed lo provide the borrower with pertinent infonnation during the 
sclllement process in order to be a heller shopper. 
The Public Reporting Burden for this collection of information is estimated to ~ 
average one hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the datn needed. and 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
• 
:.· 11c t~u. v, 1 J10J-1v11 ~ 
L. Sctrlcinen~ Cliargcs 
700. Total Saks/Broker's Commission based 011 price S3,50U,00U.00 @% SO.OU Paid From Paid From 
Division ofCmnmission (line 700) as follows: Borrower's Seller's 
701. lo Funds al Funds al 
702. lo Settlement Sctllcmcnt 
703. Commissiun l'aid al Sclllcmcnt SO.OD SO.OU 
800. Items Payable in Connection with Loan 
80 I. Loan Origination Fee % to 
802. Loan Discount o/o to 
803. Appraisal Fee to ,JOE DUNLOP $500.00 
804. Credit Report lo 
805. Lender's Inspection Fee lo 
806. Mortgage Insurance Application to 
807. Assumption Fee to 
808. PROCESSING !'EE to KE Capital Services SS00.00 
809. INTEREST AND POINTS lo I( E Capital Sen·iccs $61,489.73 
I 003. Cou11ty Property Taxes months@ S147.58 per month 
1004. Asscssmc11t Ta~es months@ per month 
1005. I-IOA Dues months @ per month 
1006. mo11U1s@ per monU1 
1007. months@ per month 
1008. 111onU1s @ per rnonU1 
1011. Aggregate Adjustment 
1100. Title Charges 
110 I. Sculemenl or closing rec to Premier Tille Insurance Agency Inc. S I 00.00 S100.00 
1102. Abstract or title search to Premier TIiie Jnsurnnce Agency Inc. 
1103. TiUe examination lo Premier Tille Insurance Agency Jue. 
1104. Tille insurance binder to P r emier Title Insurance Agency Inc. 
1105. Document preparation lo Premier Title Insurance Agency Inc. $25.00 S25.00 
/ I 06. Notary fees lo Premier Tille Insurance Agency Inc. 
I 107. Altomcy's fees to 
(includes above items numbers: 
I I 08. Title insurance to l'rcmicr T ille Insurance Agency Inc_ 
(includes above items numbers: 
I I 09. Lender's coverage $750,000.00/$1,737.00. 
l 110. Owner's coverage $3,500,000 .00/$7 ,548.00 
I 111 . Escrow fee to 
I 112. ENDORSEMENTS l 00, I 16,8. 1 lo Premic,· Tillc Insurance Agency Inc. $55.00 
1205. Courier/Messenger Fee to Premier Title Insurance Agency Inc. $50.00 SS0.00 
1206. RECONVEYANCE lo Premier Title Insurance Agency Inc. S\50.00 
1207. RECORDING to Premier T itle Insura nce Agency Inc. $100.00 
1300. Addition:il Settlemen t Charges 
130 1. Survey lo 
I 302. Pcsl Inspection to 
1400. Tolal Settlemen t C harges (enter on lines 103, Section J and 502, Section K) S64,556.73 $7,873.00 
I have carefully reviewed the I IUD-I Selllcmcnl Sta1e111en1 and lo lhe hest ofmy knowledge and bel ief, it is a true and accuralc s tatement o f a ll receipts and 
disbursements made on my account or by me in this transact ion. I further certify that I have received a completed copy of pages I , 2 and 3 of this HUD-I Scnlcmcnt 
Statement. 
Equity Partners LLC 
By 
SETTLEMENT AGENT CERT!l'ICATION 
l'hc HUD- I Sclllcment Sta1e111cut which I have prepared is a trut: aml accuralc 
1ccou11t o rL11is transaction. I have caused lhc funds to Ile disbursed in 
,ccordancc with this slalcmcnl. 
Sclllcmcnl /\gent Dale 
W arning: II is a crime lo knowingly make false sw1c111cn1s lo the Unilcd 
Stales 0 11 this or any other s imilar lo1111. l'cnaltics npcn conviction can 
include a lim: and impriso11mcnl. For derails sec: Tille 18 U.S. Code Sccliun 
I 00 I and Section l 0 I 0. Jrs;:onw.:,,,mui"°"",;j,ii,ii...,;lU....,....,..;.;,.;.,;;;.;,.;;,,.,_,.....,......,fh..':'ffllnf.m .,,n1&..,.~_,,4 .. ,...,.._ ... _r,l11 .l...._,_, ....... _.....,,.,,.wowu;...,,....,,.,,_,...,,,....,._.,.,.,, .... _,,..,.,_,,,R .. i .. . _lll_....,..,,,i'A,..,_._...., ____ _______ _,IGS _______ _ 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Addendum C 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 







Tivoli Properties, LLC 
A Utah Limited Liability Company 
TI-TIS OPERA TIN'G AGREEMENT is made and entered into as of August 15, 2007 by and among . . 
Equity Partners, LLC and Kerry R. and Bobbie M. Posey, ie; Tivoli Properties LLC, a Utah LLC (the 
"Company") and the persons executing this Operating Agreement as Members of the Company and all of 
those who shall hereafter be admitted as Members (individually, a "Member" and collectively, the · 
"Members") whose names and signatures shall appear on "MEMBER LISTING; CAPITAL 
CONTRIBUTIONS," below, hereby agree as follows: 
W1TNESSETH: 
1. Whereas, the Members desire lo enter into this agreement ("Operating Agreement") or 
("Agreement") for the purposes of governing the Company, to and for the sole purpose of investing in, 
purchasing, selling, granting, or taking an option on lands for investment purposes and/or development. 
The Company shall not conduct any other business unless related to the business, wlless approved by 
unanimous consent of all Members. 
2. Whereas, a limited liability company was formed in accordance with the provisions of 
the Utah Limited Liability Company Act (the "Act") under the name of Tivoli Properties, LLC (the 
• "Company") pursuant to a Certificate of Formation filed November l l, 2007, with the Utah Division of 
Corporation. This O~erating Agreement of the Company was entered into as of that same date. 
3. Whereas, the Members intend to operate the Company; appoint a person or persons to assume 
responsibility for certain management matters (the "Manager") and provide for the restriction on the 
transfers of ownership interests in the Company ("Interests") . 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual premises bdow, and other good and 
valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, it is agreed as 
follows: 
I. DEFINITIONS 
1.1 Scope. For purposes of this Agreement, unless the language or context clearly indicates that 
a different meaning is intended, the following capitalized terms shall have the meanings specified in this 
Article. 
1.2. Defined Terms . 
1.2. 1. "Act" means the Utah Revised Limited Liability Company Act and any successor 
statute, as amended from time lo time. 
1.2.2 .. "Agreement" means this Operating Agreement, including any amendments, 
• supplements, or modi-fications thereto. 
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1.2.3. "Articles" means the articles of organization filed with the Utah Department of 
Commerce, Division of Corporations and Commercial Code, to organize the Company as a limited· 
liability company, including any amendments. 
1.2.4 "Available Funds" means-the Company's gross cash receipts from 9perations, less 
the sum of: (a) payments of principal, interest, charges, and fees pertaining to the Company's 
indebtedness; (bO expenditures incurred incide_nt to the usual conductof the Company's business, 
including with out limitation the Manager compensation payments made pursuant to Article 7.9; and©) 
amounts reserved to meet the reasonable needs of the Company's business in the future as detennihed by 
the Manager in its sole discretion. 
1.2.5 "Capital Account" of a Member means the capital account maintained for the 
Member in accordance with Article II, paragraph 5. 
1.2.6 "Code" means the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended. 
1.2. 7 "Company" means Tivoli Properties, LLC, a Utah Limited Liability Company. _ 
1.2.8. "Loan" means the acquisition and development loan obtained by Equity Partners, 
LLC from a third party lending institution to finance the acquisition and development of the Property. 
· 1.2.9 "Loss" means, for any given tax year, the Company,s loss for such tax year, as 
determined in accordance with accounting principles appropriate to the Company's method of accounting 
and consistently applied. 
1.2. l 0. "Manager" means a Person, Persons or Committee, whether or not consisting:of 
a Member, Members or not; who is vested with authority to manage the-Company in accordance with 
Article vrr. 
1.2.11. "Member" means an initial member of the Company and any Person who is 
subsequently admitted as an additional or substitute member of the Company pursuant to the terms of this 
Agreement. 
l .2.12 "Membership Interest" or "Interest" means a Member's percentage interest in 
the Company, consisting of the Member's right to share in Profits, receive distributions, participate in the 
Company's governance, approve the Company's acts, participate in the designation and removal of a 
Manager, and receive infonnation pertaining to the Company's affairs. The Membership Interests of the 
initial Members are set forth in Article 3.3. Changes in Membership Interests after the date of this 
Agreement, including those necessitated by the admission and dissociation of Members, will be reflected 
in the Company's records. The allocation of Membership Interests reflected in the Company's records 
from time to time is presumed to be correct for all purposes of this Agreement and the Act. Except as 
expressly provided otherwise herein, with respect to the interest of a Transferee, "Interest'' or 
"Membership Interest" means a Transferee's percentage interest in distributions from the Company; 
provided that nothing in this sentence shall be interpreted to grant to a Transferee the right to vote on or 
otherwise participate in any matter as a Member hereunder other than the right to receive distributions as 
set forth in Article 6.1.5. 
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l.2.13. "Net Investment" means, with respect to each Member and as of any given date 
of determination, the aggregate amount of cash capital contributions actually paid to and received by the 
Company from such Member less all amounts of Available Funds distributed to such Member by the 
Company with respect to such Member's Membership Interest. 
1.2.14. "Person" means any individuat association, cooperative, corporation, trust, 
partnership, joint venture, limited liability company, or other legal entity. 
1.2.15. "Profit" means, with respect to any given tax year, the Company's income for 
such tax year, as determined in accordance with accounting principles appropriate to the Company's, 
method of accounting and consistently applied. 
1.2.16. "Purchase Agreement" means that certain Real Estate Purchase Contract, 
entered into by and among Equity Partners, LLC, as buyer, and Poseys as Seller, pursuant to which Seller . 
has agreed to sell and Equity Partners, LLC has agreed to purchase, the Property, as such contract is 
amended from time to time. 
1.2.17 "Regulations" means proposed, temporary, or final regulations promulgated 
under the Code by the Department of the Treasury, as amended. 
1.2.18 "Seller" means, collectively, Kerry R. Posey, both individually and as a trustee of 
the Kerry R. Posey Charitable Remainder Unitrust, and Bobbie M. Posey, both individually and as trustee 
of the Bobbie M. Posey Charitable Remainder Unitrust, in each case in such individuaJts or trustee's 
capacity as a seller under the Purchase Agreement. 
1.2.19. "Property" means approximately 29 acres of real propertY:located in Utah 
County, Utah, held by Seller, Assessor Parcel Numbers 58-035-0029 and 58-035-0030,-which-real 
.property is the subject of the Purchase Agreement. 
1.2.20 "Developer" means, Tivoli Properties, LLC, a Utah Limited Liability Company, 
established to manage, improve, subdivide, develop, lease, and sell the Property and to perform all other 
activities reasonably related thereto. 
1.2.21 "Transfer" means, with respect to an Interest, a sale, pledge, encumbrance, lien, 
assignment, subordinate, gift or any other disposition, direct or indirect, by Member, whether voluntary, 
involuntary, or by operation of law; provided, however, that the term "Transfer" shall not include a 
redemption of all or part of a member's Membership Interest by the Company. 
1.2.22. "Transferee" means a Person who acquires a Membership Interest by Transfer 
from a Member or another Transferee and is not admitted as a Member in accordance with the Agreement. 
Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, a Transferee shall not have the rights of a Member set 
forth in Article 1.2.11, other than the right to receive distributions as set forth herein. 
1.2.23. "Sharing Ratio" shall mean the percentage representing the ratio that the 
number of Units owned by a Member bears to the aggregate number of Units owned by all of the 
Members. Upon the issuance of additional Units or the transfer, repurchase or cancellation of any 
outstanding Units, the Sharing Ratios of the Members shall be recalculated as of the date of such issuance, 
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transfer, repurchase or cancellation. The recalculated Sharing Ratio of each Member shall be the 
percentage representing the ratio that the number of Units owned by the Member bears to the aggregate 
number of Units owned by all of the Members after giving effect to the issuance, transfer, repurchase or 
cancellation. 
1.2.24. "Unit" shall mean an equity interest in the Company. The Company shall have 
two classes of Units: Class A and Class B. The two classes of Units shall be identical in all respects 
except for their respective Voting Interests. The number of Units owned by each Member shall be 
detennined in connection with the issuance of a membership interest in the Company in exchange for the 
capital contribution made by such Member. Initially the Units shall not be represented by certificates. If 
the Management Committee detennines that it is in the interest of the Co~pany to issue certificates 
representing the Units, certificates shall be issued and the Units shall be represented by such.certificates. 
The Company is authorized to issue 1,000,000,000 Class A Units and 200,000,000 Class B Units. 
l .2.25 "Voting Interest" (a) With respect to the Class A Units, "Voting Interest" shall 
mean that number of Class A Units held by a Member, and (b) with respect to the Class B Units, "Voting 
Interest" shall mean that number of Class B Units held by a Member divided by IO. 
II. ORGANIZATION 
2.1. Formation of the Company. The Company has been organized as a Utah Limited Liability 
Company pursuant to the Act. The rights and obligations of the Members shall be as set forth in the Act 
unless the Articles or this Agreemeqt expressly provide otherwise, in which case the provisions of the 
Articles or this Agreement shall control. 
2.2. Name of the Company. The name of the Company shall be: TIVOLI PROPERTIES, 
L.L.C. and all Company business shall be conducted in that name. or such other name the Members may 
. select from time to time and whlch is in compliance with applicable laws. 
2.3. Registered Agent and Location of Records. The registered agent and registered office of 
the Company in the State of Utah shall be the initial registered agent and registered office set forth in the 
Articles or such other Person or location, as the case may be, as the Manager may designate from time to 
time. The records of the Company required to be maintained by the Act shall be kept at the designated 
office identified in the Articles, or at such other designated office as the Manager may designate from 
time to time, consistent with the Act. 
2.4. Purposes of the Company. The Company is organized for the purpose of carrying on the 
business of acquiring, managing, improving, subdividing, deveJoping, leasing and selling the Property or 
any other enterprise that members may mutually agree upon. 
2.5. Fiscal year, accounting. The Company's fisca) year shall be the calendar year. the particular 
accounting methods and principals to be followed by the Company shall be selected by the accountant for 
the Company (''Accountantn) who is hereby designated as Dallas Cooke, CPA as the independent CPA 
fill!, The CPA Accountant may be changed by written Notice of the then serving Manager, consented to 
in writing by at least Two (2) Members. 
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2.6. Reports. The Managers shall provide reports concerning the financial condition and results 
of operation of the Company and the Capital Accounts of the Members to the Members in the time, 
manner, and form as the Manager determines. Such reports shall be provided at least aD.11:ually as soon as 
practible after the end of each calendar year and shall include a statement of each Member's share of 
profits and other items of income, gain, loss, deduction and credit. 
2. 7. Term of Existence. The company shall begin on 15th day of August, 2007, and shall 
continue until dissolved by mutual consent or by a 30 day notice in writing on the part of the person or 
persons desiring to withdraw to the other member or members of the company, and the member or 
m~rnbers desiring to withdraw shall first offer all his right, title and interest in the company and assets 
thereof to the other member or members at a valuation to be determined by three disinterested persons, 
one of whom shall be named by the member or members desiring to withdraw, one by the remaining 
member or members and the third by the two so chosen. 
III. CAPITAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
3.1 Initial Capital Contributions. The Members shall make the following initial capital 
contributions to the Company, in cas~ services, or property, in the following amounts: 
3.1.1. Contributions from Equity Partners. Equity Partners shall contribute and 
assign to the Company all of Equity Partners' right, title, and interest as buyer in, to, and under the 
Purchase Agreement and the Company shall assume and shall perform all of Equity Partners obligations 
as buyer thereunder. Furthermore,. Equity Partners will arrange for, sign and guarantee an interim loan in 
the amount of Seven Hundred-Fifty Thousand Dollars ($750,000.00) which will be used as operating 
capital for the Company. Additionally, all amounts.paid by Equity Partners pursuant to the entitlement 
process, ~chase Agreement or otherwise related to the acquisition and development of the Property, 
-whethef,p.a.id·:prior to or after the execution. of this Agreement, shall be deemed to be capital contributions 
made to the Company by Equity Partners. As of the date of this Agreement, the aggregate amount of such 
deemed capital contribution made by Equity Partners to the Company $800,000.00. Once the Loan is 
obtained, Equity Partners shall set aside and pay $10,000.00 per month to the Sellers from the operating 
capital of the Company. As a result of such contribution, Equity Partners has been credited with a capital 
account equal to $800,000.00, and has received 800,000 Class A Units. 
3.1.2 Contribution from Kerry R. Posey. Kerry R. Posey shall contribute the canying 
costs of his subordination agreement under the Purchase Agreement and shall contribute One Hundred 
Seventy-five Thousand J?ollars ($175,000.00) be deemed to be capital contributions made to the Company 
by Kerry R. Posey. As a ·result of such contribution, Kerry R. Posey has been credited with a capital 
account equal to $125,000.00, and has received 100,000 Class A Units and 25,000 Class B Units. 
3.1.3 Contribution from Bobbie M. Posey. Bobbie M .. Posey shall contribute the 
carrying costs of her subordination agreement under the Purchase Agreement and shall contribute One 
Hundred Seventy-five Thousand Dollars ($175,000.00) be deemed to be capital contributions made to the 
Company by Bobbie M. Posey. As a result of such contribution, Bobbie M. Posey has been credited with 
a capital account equal to $125,000.00, and has received I 00,000 Class A Units and 25,000 Class 8 Units 
3.2 Initial Commitments and Contributions. By the execution of this Operating Agreement, 
the initial Members hereby agree to make the capital contributions set forth herein. Tpe interests of the 
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respective Members in the total capital of the Company (their respective "Sharing Ratios", as adjusted 
from time to time to reflect changes in the Capital Accounts of the Members and the total capital in the 
Company). Any additional Member (other.than an assignee of a Membersh.ip Interest who has been 
admitted as a Member) on any capital contribution except as provided in this Operating Agreement. 
3.3 Allocation of Membership Interest, As a result of the transactions described above, the 
Members own the number and classes of Units and have capital account balances attributable to the Units 
as set forth below: 
Member Class "A" Units Class "B" Units Capita) Account Balance 
Equity Partners 750,000 -0- $750,000 
Kerry R. Posey 100,000 25,000 $125,000 
Bobbie M. Posey 100,000 25,000 $125,000 
Based on the above, the initial Sharing Ratio of Equity Partners is 75%, and the initial Sharing Ratio of 
·Kerry R. and Bobbie M. Posey is· 12.5% each. 
' 3.4 Subsequent Capital Contributions No Member shall be obligated to make any capital 
contributions to the Company other than those set forth herein, except as the Company and such Member 
may agree in writing. · 
3.5 Failure to Contribute. If any member fails to make a capital contribution when required,. µte 
Company may,. in addition to the other rights and remedies the ·company may have under the Act or 
·applicable law, take such enforcement action (including, the commencement and prosecution of court 
·proceedings) against such Member as the Managers consider appropriate. Moreover, the remaining 
Members may elect to contribute the amount of such required capital themselves according to their 
respective Sharing Ratios. In such an event, the remaining Members shall be entitled to treat such amounts 
as an extension of credit to such defaulting Member, payable upon demand, with interest accruing thereon 
at the federal midterm rate provided for under Code Sec. l 274(d), plus Two Percent (2%) until paid, all of 
which shall be secured by such defaulting Member's interest in the Company, each Member who may 
hereafter default, hereby granting to each Member who may hereafter grant such an extension of credit, a 
security interest in such defaulting Member's interest in the Company. 
3.6 Return of Capital Contributions. Except as expressly provided here~ each Member 
agrees not to withdraw as a Member of the Company and no Member shall be entitled to the return of an 
part of his or her capital contributions or to be paid interest in respect to either his or her Capital Account 
or his or her capital contributions. 
3.7 Capital Accounts of the Members. Separate Capital Accounts for each Member shall be 
maintained by the Company. Each Member's Capital Account shall reflect the Member's capital 
contributions and increases for the Member's share of any net income or gain of the Company. Each 
Member's Capital Account shall also reflect decreases for distributions made to the Member and the 
Member's share of any losses and deductions of the Company. 
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3.7.1. Each Member's Capital Account may be increased by: 
(i) The amount of money contributed by the Member to the Company. 
(ii) The fair market value of property contributed by the Member to the Company(net of 
liabilities secured by such contributed property that the Company is considered to assume 
or take subject to under Code Sec ... If any property, other than cash, is contributed to or 
distributed by the Company, the adjustments to Capital accounts required by Treasury 
Regulation Sec ... shall be made. 
(iii) The Member's share of the increase in the tax basis of Company property, if any, 
ari:5ing out of the recapture of any tax credit. 
V.MEMBERS 
5.1 Initial Members. The initial Members of the Company are the Persons executing this 
Agreement as Members as of the date first set forth above, each of which is admitted to the Company as a 
Member effective contemporaneously with the execution of this Agreement by such person. 
5.2 Member Compensation. The members shall be paid such salaries as may be agreed upon 
which will be charged as an expense of the business. 
5.2. l The salaries so paid, as provided hereof, shall not be considered as part of the 
profits to which said parties shall be entitled. 
5.3 Rights and duties of the Members. 
5.3.1 AJlocation. Each of the members shall be entitled to the net profits of the 
business, as well as the losses happening in the course of the business which shall be 
borne by each member. Such shall be borne in the same proportions as their respective 
company ownership, unless the same shall happen through the wilful neglect or default 
and not the mistake or error) of either of the members. In which case the loss so incurred 
shall be made good by the member through whose neglect or default such losses shall 
arise. 
5.3.2. Distributions. The Managers may make distributions to the Members from time 
to time. Distributions may be made only after the Managers determine in their reasonable 
judgement, that the Company has sufficient cash on hand which exceeds the current and 
the anticipated needs of the Company to fulfill its business purposes (including needs for 
operating expenses, debt service, acquisitions, reserves, and mandatory distributions, if· 
any). All distributions shall be made to the Members in accordance with their Sharing 
Ratios. Distributions shall be in cash or property or particularly in both, as determined by 
the Managers. No distribution shall be declared or made if, after giving it effect, the 
Company would not be able to pay its debts as they become due in the usual course of 
business or the Company's total assets would be less than the sum of its total liabilities 
plus, the amount that would be needed if the Company were to be dissolved at the time of 
the distribution, to satisfy the preferential rights of other Members upon dissolution that 
are superior to the rights of the Members receiving the distribution. 
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5.3.3. Family Partnership Savings Provision. Notwithstanding anything in this 
Operating Agreement to the contrary, should any provision of this Operating Agreement, 
or any act of the parties, result in violation of the family partnership provisions of Code 
Sec. 704(e) or the regulations and cases thereunder, the Managers may amend this 
Agreement, or take any other actions reasonably necessary to prevent such yiolation, or to 
correct such violation. 
5.3.4. Other business In view of the fact that all the Members are engaged in other 
business ventures, no member shall be bound to devote all of his time to the affairs of the 
company but he shall devote at least a part of his working time to the affairs of the 
company business and when the demands of the business shall warrant, he agrees to give 
his entire working time to the business. 
5.3.5 Conduct of the Company Any questions regarding the conduct of the Company 
business shall be determined by a vote of I 00% of the Managing Members of the 
Company. 
5.3.6 Business Continuation. The expulsion of any Member shall not dissolve the 
Company as to other Members, and the·remaining Members shall have right to. continue 
the Company business by themselves or in conjunction with any other person or persons 
they might select. 
5.3.7 Withdrawal The Members shall have the right to retire or withdraw from the 
Company, and this Agreement may be tenninated as to one or more Members and new 
members may be admitted under the provisions hereinafter set forth, but neither such 
retirement, withdrawal, termination, death of any Member, or admission of any new 
Member shall dissolve this Company. 
5.3.8 Selling of Members Interest Should one or more of the members desire to sell 
his or their interest in the company or to withdraw from the company he or they shall do 
so upon the following tenns: 
(i) He or they shall give to the remaining member or members 30 days' written 
notice of such intention and shall, if the other member or members indicates 
willingness to buy within such 30 days, sell to the remaining member or members 
his or their interest in the company for an amount equal to the value of the interest 
or interests according to standard accounting procedure~ In the valuation of the 
interest, market value, not book value, is to be considered; nor is goodwill to be 
considered as an asset. · 
(ii) The selling member or members shall accept payment for his or their interest 
in cash to be paid within 45 days from the giving of a notice of acceptance by the 
remaining member or members. 
(iii) The option to purchase may be exercised by the remain_ing members, if more 
than one, in equal proportion, or, if one of them fails to exercise his option and 
the others do not fail to do so, the latter shall have the right to purchase the whole 
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(.:jp' 
of the selling member's or members' interest. The selling member or members 
shall not be required to sell unless their entire interest in purchased. 
(iv) Should there be any disagreement by the members as to the value of the 
·interest of the selling member or members, the selling-member or members shall 
appoint an arbitrator and the buying member or members shall app~int another 
and if these two arbitrators are unable to agree, the two shall appoint a third 
arbitrator, and the value of selling member's or members' interest fixed_ by said 
arbitrators or any two of them shall determine the purchase price. All parties 
agree to be bound by such decision of the arbitrators. 
5.4. Manner of Acting Among Members 
following: 
5.4.l. No Member shall, without consent in writing of the other Members, do any of the 
(i). Assign his share or interest in the Company. 
(ii) Except by will, no Member shall sell, pledge or in any way encumber his or her 
interest in the Company without written consent of all other Members. 
(iii) Without the consent of all the other Members or Member, draw, accept, or sign any 
bill of exchange or promissory note, or contract any debt on account of the Company, or 
employ any of the money or effects thereof, or in any manner pledge the credit thereof, 
except in the usual an regular course of business. Any infraction of this provision shall be 
a ground.for an immediate dissolution of the Company as regards that'Member so 
offending; and the other Members may forthwith declare the same dissolved by a written 
notice to the offending Member, or left for him at the office_ofthe Company. 
(iv) Without the consent of all the other Members or Member~ compound, release, or 
discharge any debt which shall be due or owing to' the Company, without receiving the 
full amount thereof. Any infraction of this provision shall be a ground for an immediate 
dissolution of the Company as regards that Member so offending, and the other Members 
may forthwith declare the same dissolved by a written notice to the offending Member, or 
left for him at the office of the Company. 
(v) Lend any money, or give credit to, or have dealings on behalf of the Company, with 
any person, company, or corporation whom the other Members or Member shall have 
forbidden him to trust or deal with; and if he shall act contrary to this provision he shall 
repay to the Company any loss which may have been incurred thereby. 
( vi) Hire or dismiss, except in case of gross misconduct, any clerk or other person in the 
employment of the Company, without the consent of all the other Members. 
(vii) Give their signature separately or collectively on behalf of the company or any 
Member thereof, except for legitimate business purposes and with the consent of 100% of 
the other Members of the Company. 
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(viii) Without the previous consent in writing of all the other Members, enter into any 
bond, or become bail, surety, or security, for any person. 
(ix) Buy, order, or contract for any article exceeding the·value of $500.00 dollars, without 
the previous consent in writing of all the other Members; and in case he or she does so, 
· the other Members shall have the option to take the goods.or articles so bought, ordered, 
or contracted for, on behalf of the Company, or to leave the same for the separate use of 
the Member.so buying, ordering, or ·contracting, to be paid for out of his or her own 
.money. 
(x) Have the right to embark in any speculative transactions involving the Company 
without the consent of all the other Members. 
(xi) Divulge to any person not a Member of the Company any trade secret connected with 
the Company business that shall come to his or her knowledge by reason of his or her 
being a Member, during the continuance of this Company and for five (5) years after its 
termination. 
(xii) With the approval of al1 the other Members and consent of the all Members, any 
Member shall be entitled to purchase any goods carried by the Company at actual invoice 
price, plus the freight. 
5.4.2 Meetings. An annual meeting of Members for the transaction of such business as 
may properly come before the Meeting, shall be held at such place, on such date and at 
such time as the Managers shall detennine. Special meetings of Members for any prop~r 
purpose or purposes may be called at any time by the Managers or the holders of at least 
Ten Percent(} 0%) of the Sharing Ratios of all Members. Toe· Company·shall deliver or 
mail written Notice stating the date, time , place, and purposes of any meeting to each 
Member entitled to vote at the meeting. Such Notice shall be given not.less than Ten(IO) 
and no more than Sixty(60) days before the date of the meeting. All meetings of Members 
sha11 be presided over by a Chairperson who shall be a Manager. A Member may 
participate and vote at such meeting via phone conference call. 
5.4.3. Consent. Any action required or permitted to be taken at an annual or special 
meeting of the Members may be taken without a meeting, without prior Notice, and 
without a vote, if consents in writing, setting forth the action so taken, arc signed by the 
Members having not less than the minimum number of v~tes that would be necessary to 
authorize or take action were present and voted. Every written consent shall bear the date 
and signature of each Member who signs the consent. Prompt Notice of the taking of 
action without a meeting by less than unanimous written consent shall be given to all 
Members who have not consented in writing to such action. 
5.4.4 Voting Rights. Each member shall have a number of votes equal to such 
Member's Membership Interest in the Company. 
5.4.4.1 Required Vote. Except with respect to matters for which a greater 
minimwn vote is required by the Act or this Agreement, the vote of Members 
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whose aggregate Membership Interest exceeds 50% of the aggregate Membership Interest 
of all Members present binds the Company. 
VI. TERMl.i'lATION OR DISSOLUTION 
6.1 Accounting. Upon the dissolution of the Company a full and general account of the 
assets, liabilities, and transactions of the Company shall be taken, and the assets and.property 
thereof shall, as soon as practicable, be sold, the debts due the Company collected, the proceeds 
applied, first, in discharge of the liabilities of the company and the expenses of liquidating the 
same; and next in payment to each Member or his or her representatives of any unpaid interest or 
profits belonging to him or her, and of his or her share of the capital; and the surplus, if any, shall 
be divided between the Members or their representatives in equal shares; and the Members or 
their representatives shall execute all such instruments for facilitating the collection and division 
of the Company, and for their mutual indemnity and release, as may be requisite or proper. 
6.2 Distrib_ution. The Members agree that the detennination of the amount.to be paid-
to either Member shall be detennined by the auditor or certified public accountant then 
employed by the company, and such computation shall be final and conclusive upon them. 
6.3. Goodwill On the tennination or dissolution of the Company or the death or 
retirement therefrom of a Member, neither the goodwill of the Company nor the right to the use of 
the firm name shall be considered as an asset of the Company, nor shall any value be placed 
thereon for the purpose of accounting or distribution. 
6.4 · Death of Member Upon the death of any Member, the Company shall immediately 
cease as to him or her, but shall continue as to the survivors in accordance with the terms and 
conditions hereinafter set forth. 
(i). Upon the death of any Member, the surviving Members shall have the right to 
purchase the interest of the deceased Member at the appraised value reached by appraisers 
selected as herein stated. 
(ii) If the surviving Members do not desire to purchase the interest of the deceased 
Member, they shall have the right to continue to operate the Company business so long as 
it shows a profit; and accurate records shall be kept and frequent audits made to ascertain 
whether a profit is being made for a term of one year. In this event the profits of the 
deceased Member shall be paid to his or her legal representative or representatives in 
semiannual installments. 
(iii) After the term of one year without the surviving Members purchase of the interest of 
the deceased Member, an account and statement shall be taken and made out of his or her 
share of the capital and effects of the Company, and of all unpaid interest and profits 
belonging to him or her up to the time of his decease plus the year extension, for which 
purpose a valuation shall be made of any assets or effects requiring valuation, and the 
amount so ascertained to be due and owing to the deceased Member shall be paid by the 
surviving Members to his or her representatives within three (3) calendar months from the 
date of the one year extension from his or her decease, with interest thereon until payment 
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at the rate of 10 percent per annum (10%); and on such payment the share of the deceased 
Member in the Company property and effects shall go and belong to the surviving 
Members in the proportions in which they shall have contributed to the purchase thereof. 
(iv) In case of the death of a Member and of the purchase ofhls or her interest by the 
remaining Members as herein provided, the right to use the name of the Company and to 
carry on the business under such name shall, so far as the deceased Member is concerned, 
be the property of the remaining Members. 
(v) In the event the remaining Members do not perform under the terms set forth above in 
respect to the purchase of the deceased portion of the Company, the Company's business 
shall be wound up and liquidated in 30 days from the fore-named time limit and divided 
as· herein provided. 
6.5 Bankruptcy or insolvency of a Member. If any member shall be adjudicated bankrupt, or 
insolvent, or take proceedings for liquidation by arrangement or composition with it, his or her creditors, 
the Company shall thereupon terminate as to it, him, or her and it, he, she, or its, his or her executors, 
administrators or assigns, as the case may be, shall have no interest in common with the surviving or other 
Members or Member in the property of the Company, but shall be considered in equity as a vendor to the 
surviving Members or Member for the share in the company of the bankrupt or liquidating or 
compounding Member as and from the date of its, his or her bankruptcy, or.insolvency, or of its, his or her 
having compounded as aforesaid, for the price and on the terms to be arrived at under the provisions 
hereinbefore contained. 
6.5.1 This Agreement is expressly not int~nded for the benefit of any creditor of the 
Company, the Manager, tb.e Members, or any other Person. Except and only to the extent 
provided by applicable statute, no such creditor or third party shall have any rights under 
this Agreement. No third person shall under any circumstances have any right to compel 
any actions or payments by the Company, any Manager, or any Member. 
VII. BUSINESS OF THE COMPANY 
7.1 Business of the Company. (a) Equity Partners, LLC ("EP") shall have full, exclusive and 
complete authority and discretion in the management and control of the business of the Company for the 
purposes herein stated and shall make all decisions affecting the business of the Company. At-such, any 
action taken shall constitute the act of, and serve to bind, the Company. EP shall manage and control the 
affairs of the Company to the best of its ability and shall use its best efforts to carry out the business of the 
Company and will be compensated for providing various services. 
(b) The expenses so paid, as provided hereof. shall not be considered as part of the 
profits to which any of the parties shall be entitled. 
( c) All the members of the company shall fix the wages or salaries to be paid to any of 
the members of the company, and shall be binding upon all. 
(d) The Company has retained Four Winds Development Group, LLC ("Four Winds") as . 
their representative to obtain all necessary governmental permits, approvals and 
entitlements which are required to allow the improvement, development, construction and 
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sale of the real estate property. Such expenses are considered expenses of the Company 
and shall be paid by Four Winds and shall be reimbursed by the Company. 
(e) The Company shall indemnify, save harmless, and pay all expenses, costs, or 
liabilities of any Member who for the benefit of the Company makes any deposit, acquires 
any option, or makes any other similar payment or assume.s;any.obligation in connection 
with any property proposed to be acquired by the Company;'which action shall have been 
consented to by the Company, and who suffers any financial loss as the result of such 
action. 
7.2 Change of Managers The Members from time to time may change the number of Managers 
upon the affirmative vote or written consent of Members holding an aggregate ofnot less than 100% of 
the outstanding Membership Interest. 
7.3 Election of Managers Managers shall be elected at a meeting of the Members in the case 
of a Manager vacancy. If more than one Manager is to be elected, all management positions shall be filled 
in the same election, i.e.; the candidate with the highest vote total will fill the first available positio~ the 
candidate with the next highest vote total will fill the next available position, and so forth. In voting for 
Managers, each Member shall have the number of votes equal to his, her or its Membership Interest. 
Members may cast all of their votes for one candidate, or divide their votes among multiple candidates. 
7.4. General Powers of Managers. Except as may otherwise be provided in this Operating 
Agreement, the ordinary and usual decisions concerning the business and affairs of the Company, shall be 
made by the Managers. The managers have the power, on behalf of the Company, to do all things 
necessary or convenient to carry out the business and affairs of the Company, including, the power to: 
7.4.1 Purchase, lease, or otheiwise acquire any real or personal property; 
Sell, convey, mortgage, grant a security interest in, pledge, lease, exchange, or otherwise 
dispose or encumber any real or personal property; 
7.4.2 Open one or more depository accounts and make deposits into, and write checks 
and withdrawals against such accounts; 
7.4.3 Borrow money, incur liabilities, and other obligations; 
7.4.4 Enter into any and all agreements and execute any and all contracts, documents, and 
instruments relating to the Business; 
7.4.5 Engage consultants and agents, define their respective duties and establish their 
compensation or remuneration; 
7.4.6 Obtain insurance covering the Business and affairs of the Company's name; 
7.4.7 Participate with others in partnerships, joint ventures, and other associations and 
strategic aliiances onJy where same are directly in pursuit of the Business, as defined 
above. 
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7.4. 7. l There is an express limitation on the nature of the Business and the 
powers granted the Managers herell\ the Company is intended to purchase and 
develop. hold and sale real estate for investment purposes only, and no activities 
inconsistent with such limited purposes shall be undertaken. 
7.5. Limitations. Notwithstanding the foregoing and any other provision contained in this 
Operating Agreement to the contrary, no act shall be taken, sum expended, decision made, obligation 
incurred or power exercised by any Manager on behalf of the Company except by the consent of One 
Hundred percent (100%) of all Membership Interests with respect to: 
7.5.1 Any significant and material purchase, receipt, lease, exchange, or other acquisition 
of any real or personal property or business; 
7.5.2 The sale of all or substantially all oftbe assets and property of the Company; 
7.5.3 Any mortgage, grant of security interest, pledge, or encumbrance upon all or 
substantially all of the assets and property of the Company; 
7.5.4 Any merger; 
7.5.5 Any amendment or restatement of the Articles or of this Operating Agreement; 
7.5.6 Any matter which could result in a change in the amount or character of the 
Company's capital; 
7.5.7 Any change in the character of the business and affairs of the Company; 
7.5.8 The commission of any act which would make it impossible for the Company to 
carry on its ordiiiary bus~ness and affairs; 
7 .5 .9 Any act that would contravene any provision of the Articles or of this Operating 
agreement or the Act. 
7.6. Standard of Care. Every Manager shall discharge }us or her duties as a Manager in good 
faith, with care an ordinary prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar circumstances, 
and in a manner he or she reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the Company. A manager shall" 
not be liable for any monetary damages to the Company for any breach ofsuch duties except for a receipt 
of a financial benefit to which the Manager is not entitled; voting for or assenting to a distribution to 
Members in v1olation of this Operating Agreement. 
7.7 Tenure of Managers. Each Manager shall serve for an indefinite period, except that: (a) a 
Manager may resign at any time by giving written notice to the Members at least 30 days prior to the 
effective date of the resignation; (b) a Manager who is a natural personal shall cease to be a Manager upon 
his or her death or at such time as he or she is adjudicated incompetent; (c) a Manager who is a legal 
entity other than a natural person shall cease to be a Manager upon its dissolution or upon a change in the 
controlling ownership of such Person; (d) a Manager shall cease to be a Manager at such time as he or she 
files , or fails to successfully contest, a petition seeking liquidation, reorganization, arrangement, 
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readjustment, protection, relief, or composition in any state or federal bankruptcy, insolvency, 
reorganization, or receivership proceeding; and ( e) if a court of competentjurisdiction removes a Manager 
for cause, such Manager shall cease to be a Manager upon the date of such order. 
7.8. Managers Need Not be Members. A Manager need not also be a Member. 
7.9. Informal Action. Any action required or permitted to be taken by the Manager may be taken 
without a meeting if the action is evidenced by a written record describing the action taken, signed by the 
Manager. 
VIII. EXCVLPATION OF LIABILITY: INDEMNIFICATION 
8.1. Exculpation of Liability. Unless otherwise provide by law·or expressly assumed, a 
person who is a Member or Manager, or both, shall not be liable for the acts, debts or liabilities of the' 
Company. 
8.2. Indemnification. Except as otherwise provided in this Article, the Company shall indemnify 
any Manager and may indemnify any employee or agent of the Company who was or i~ a party or is 
threatened to be made a party to a threatened, pending or completed action, suit or proceeding, whether 
civil, criminal, administrative, or investigative, and whether formal or informal, other than an action by or 
in the right of the Company, by reason of the fact that such person is or was a Manager, employee or agent 
of the Company against expenses, including attorney's fees, judgements, penalties, fines, and amounts 
paid in settlement actually and reasonably incurred by such person in connection with the action, suit or 
proceeding, if the person acted in good faith, with the care an ordinary prudent person in a like position 
would exercise under similar circumstances, and in a manner that such person reasonably believed to be in 
the best interests of the Company and with respect ~o a criminal act10n or proceeding, if such person had 
no reasonable cause to believe such person's conduct was unlawful. 
8.2.1. To the extent that a Member, employee, or agent of the Company has been 
successful on the merits or otherwise in defense of an action, suit, or proceeding or in the 
defense of any claim, issue, or other matter in the action, suit, or proceeding, such person 
shall be indemnified against actual and reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, 
incurred by such person in connection with the action, suit, or proceeding and any action, 
suit or proceeding brought to enforce the mandatory indemnification provided herein. Any 
indemnification permitted under this Article, unless ordered by a court, shall be made by 
the Company only as authorized in the specific case upon a determination that the 
indemnification is proper under the circumstances because the person to be indemnified 
has met the applicable standard of conduct and upon an evaluation shall be made by a 
majority vote of the Members who are not parties or threatened to be made parties to the 
action, suit, or proceeding. Notwithstanding the forgoing to the contrary, no 
indemnification shall be provided to any Manager, employee, agent of the Company for or 
in connection with the receipt of a financial benefit to which such person is not entitled, 
voting for or assenting to a distribution to Members in violation of this Operating 
Agreement or the Act, or a knowing violation of law. 
8.3 Insurance. The Company shall maintain for the protection of the Company and all of its 
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Members such insurance as the Management Committee, inits sole discretion, deems necessary for the 
operations being conducted. 
IX. AGREEMENTS WITH THIRD PARTIES AND \VITH AFFILIATES OF THE 
COMPANY 
9.1. Validity of Transactions. Affiliates of the parties to th.is Agreement maybe engaged to 
perform services for the Company. The validity of any transaction, agreement or payment involving the 
Company and any Affiliates of the parties to this Agreement otherwise permitted by the tenns of this 
Agreement shall not be affected by reason of the relationship between them and such Affiliates or the 
approval of said transactions, agreement or payment. 
9.2. Other Activities Any Member and the Managers may engage in other business ventures: of 
every nature, including, without limitation by specification, the ownership of another business similar to 
that operated by the Company. Neither the Company nor any of the other Members shal1 have.any right or 
interest in any such independent venture or to the income and profits derived therefrom. 
X. BOOKS, RECORDS, REPORTS, AND BANK ACCOUNTS. 
10.1 There shall be kept at all times, during the continuance of the company, full and correct 
books of account wherein each of the members shall enter all moneys by them or either of them received, 
paid, laid out, or expended in and about the business, as well as all goods, wares, commodities, and 
merchandise by them or either of them bought or sold, by reason or on account of the business and the 
management thereof in any wise belonging. The books shall be used in common among the members, so 
that any of them n:iay have access thereto without an interruption-or hindrance of the others. 
10.1.1 The company shall operate on the basis of a calendar year. On the last day of each 
year, a general account shall be taken of the assets and liabilities of the company and .of 
all dealings and transactions of the same during the then preceding calendar year or 
portion thereof. 
10.1.2 The bankers of the firm shall be Zion's 1st National Bank or such other bankers as 
shall from time to time be agreed upon by the members, and all money and credits not 
required for current expenses shall be deposited with the bank, and all checks, drafts, bills 
of exchange, promissory notes or the like drawn thereon shall be signed one member and 
countersigned by another, and shall be of no effect unless so signed and countersigned. 
All indorsement of commercial paper by the company shall be by the company stamp or 
name affixed by any member, and the same shall be signed by two members; and shall be 
of no effect wtless so made. If any member shall give such obligation, except in the case 
aforesaid, the same shall be deemed to be given on his separate account and shall be 
payable out of his separate estate, and he shall indemnify the other member or members 
against the payment thereof. 
10. 2 Schedule K-1. On or before the 90111 day following the end of each fiscal year of the 
Company's existence, the Company shall cause each Member to be furnished with a federal (and where 
applicable state) income tax reporting Schedule K-1 or its equivalent. 
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10.3 "Tax Matters Partner.,, The Members shall designate a Member to the L'Tax Matters 
Partner" of the Company pursuant to Section 6231 (a)(7) of the Code. The Member so designated is 
authorized to take such actions as are permitted by Sections 622 l through 6233 of the Code. The initial 
Tax Matters Partn.er shall be James Didericksen, in his capacity as a Member of Equity Partners. The Tax 
Matters Partner may be removed by the Members at any time with or without cause. The Tax Matters 
Partner will inform the Members of all administrative and judicial proceedings pertaining to the 
· determination of the Company's tax items and will provide the Members with copies of all notices 
received from the Internal Revenue Service regarding the commencement of a Company-level audit or a 
proposed adjustment of any of the Company's tax items. The Company will reimburse the Tax Matters 
Partner for reasonable expenses properly incurred while acting within the scope of the Tax Matters 
Partner's authority, including, but not limited to, legal a~d accounting fees, claims, liabilities, losses, and 
damages. The payment of such expenses shall be made as an expense of the Company and before any 
distributions are made to Members. The provisions related to limitation of liability and indemnification of 
the Managers set forth in this Agreement shall be fully applicable to the Member acting as the Tax 
Matters Partner for the Company. 
XI. DISSOLUTION AND WINDING UP 
11.1. Dissolution. The Company shall dissolve and its affairs shall be wound up on the first to 
VP occur of the following events: 
(@_ 
(i) At any time specified in the Articles or this Operating Agreement; 
(ii) Upon the happening of any event specified in the Articles or this Operating 
Agreement; 
(iii) By the unanimous consent of all Members; 
(iv) Upon the death, withdraw I, expulsion, bankruptcy, or dissolution of a Member or the 
occurrence of any other event that tenninates the continued memberships of a Member in 
the Company unless within Ninety (90) days after the disassociation of membership, a 
majority in interest of the remaining Members consent to continue the business of the 
Company and to the admission of one or more Members as necessary. 
11.2. Winding Up. Upon dissolution, the Company shall cease carrying on its business and 
affairs and shall corrunence the winding up of the Company's business and affairs and complete the 
winding up as soon as practical. Upon the winding up of the Company, the assets of the Company shall be 
distributed first to creditors to the extent permitted by law, in satisfaction of Company debts, liabilities, 
obligations ant then to Members and former Members first, in satisfaction of liabilities for distributions 
and then, in accordance with their Sharing Ratios. Such proceeds shall be paid to such Members within 
One Hundred Twenty( 120) days after the date of winding up. 
XII. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
12.1 Formation of Company The Company was formed as a new venture for ·the purpose of 
acquiring real property for development. There can be no assurance that the real property acquired by the 
Company will be able to be developed and sold at a profit. Furthermore, there can be no assurance that 
the application of the capital contributions required hereunder and the proceeds of the Loan (if obtained 
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by Equity Partners) will be sufficient to cover the acquisition, development, and cany costs of the real 
property acquired and held by the Company. 
12.2. Disposition of Membership Interests Every sale, assignment, transfer, exchange, 
mortgage, pledge, grant, hypothecation or other disposition of any Membership Interest shall be made 
only upon compliance with this Article. No Membership Interest shall be disposed of if the disposition 
would cause a termination of the Company under Sec 708 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as 
amended; without compliance with any and all state and federal securities laws and regulations; and 
unless the assignee of the Membership Interests provides the Company with the information and 
agreements that the Managers may require in connection with such disposition, including but not lirri.ited 
to an executed counterpart of this Agreement 
12.2.1 No Member shall be entitled to assign, convey, sell, encumber, or in any way 
alienate all or any part of its Membership Interest in the Company and as a Member 
except with the prior written consent of a majority in the interest of the non-transferring 
Members, which consent may be given or withheld, conditioned, or delayed (as allowed 
by this Agreement or the Act), as the non-transferring Members may determine in their 
sole discretion. Transfers in violation of this provision shall only be effective to the extent 
of an assignment of such interest with only rights set forth in the following provision 
"Permitted Dispositions". 
12.3 Permitted Dispositions. Subject to the provisions of this Article, a Member may assign 
such Member's Membership Interest in the Company in whole or part. The assignment of a Membership 
Interest does not in itself entitle the assignee to participate in the management and affairs of the Company 
or to become a Member. Such assignee is only entitled to receive, to the extent assigned, the distributions 
the assigning JvJ:ember would otherwise be entitled to, and such assignee shall only become a a·ssignee of a 
Membership Interest and not a substitute Member. 
12.4 Acknowledgment of Access to Records. Each Member acknowledges that such Member. 
has beeri furnished and has reviewed the Articles of Organization and Operating Agreement of the 
Company and al amendments, if any, to those documents.· Each Member further aclmowledges that all 
instruments, documents, records, books, and financial information pertaining to this investment have been 
made available for inspection by such Member and it professional advisors and that the books and records 
of the Company will be available upon reasonable notice for inspection by such Member during 
reasonable business hours at the Company's principal place of business. 
12.5 Required Amendments. The Members and Managers will execute and file any 
amendments to the Articles required by the Act. If any such amendments results in inconsistencies 
between the Articles and this Agreement, this Agreement will be considered to have been amended in the 
manner necessary to eliminate the inconsistencies. 
12.6 Policies. In every instance where agreement between the members does not exist with 
reference to the policies to be followed by the company; the managing members shall have the right to 
decide what policy or policies shall be followed and the other member or members shall consider the 
decision as final. 
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12.7 Additional Instruments. Each Member will execute and deliver any document or statement 
necessary to give effect to the terms of this Agreement or to comply with any law, rule, or regulation 
governing the Company's formation and activities. 
12.8 Power of Attornev. Each Member appoints each Member, with full power of substitution, 
as the Member's attorney-in-fact, to act in the Member's name and to execute and file (a) all certificates, 
applications, reports, and other instruments necessary to qualify or maintain the Company as a limited 
liability company in the states and ·foreign countries where the Company conducts its activities, (bO all 
instruments that effect or confirm changes or modifications of the Company or its status, including, 
without limitation, amendments to the Articles, and ©) all instruments of transfer necessary to effect the 
Company's dissolution and termination. The power of attorney ·granted by this article is irrevocable, 
coupled with an interest, will survive any incapacity of the Member, and shall be binding upon the 
Member's successors and assigns. 
12.9 Disputes. In the event that any dispute should arise concerning any of the terms, covenants 
or conditions of this agreement, or with respect the enforcement thereof, or with respect to any dissolution 
or liquidation of the Company, or with respect to any matter affecting the opera'tion and conduct of the 
business of the Company, such dispute shall be disposed by arbitration by submitting the same to two 
indifferent, competent persons in or well acquainted with the trade or business of the company, one to be 
chosen by either party, or by an umpire to be chosen by the referees in the usual course in such or similar 
cases; and their or his decision shall, in all respects, be final and conclusive on both parties, and shall be 
given, in writing, within 10 days next after such submission, or within such further time, not exceeding 30 
days, as they or he shall require. · 
12.10 Entire Agreement. This Agreement embodies the entire understanding and agreement 
among the parties concerning the Company and supersedes any and all prior negotiations, understandings 
or agreements in regard thereto. 
12.11. Amendment. This Agreement may not be amended nor may any rights hereunder be 
waived except by an instrument in writing signed by Members having a Sharing Ratio of more than 50% 
in the aggregate. 
12.12 Pronouns. References to a Member, including by use of a pronoun, shall be deemed to 
include masculine, feminine, singular, plural, individuals, partnerships, corporations or other legal entities 
where applicable. 
12.13 Severability. If any provision of th.is Agreement or the application of such provision to 
any Person or circumstance shall be held invalid, the remainder of the Agreement, or the application of 
such provision to Persons or circumstances other than those as to which it is held invalid, shall not be 
affected. 
12.14 Applicable Law. The laws of the State of Utah shall govern this Agreement, 
excluding any conflict of laws rules. 
12.15 Counterparts. This instrument may be executed in any number of counterparts each of 
which shall be considered an original. 
Page 19 of 20 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12.14 Applicable Law. The laws of the State of Utah shall govern this Agreement, 
excluding any conflict of laws rules. 
"12.15 Counterparts. This instrument may be executed in any number of counterpans each of 
which shall be considered an original. 
12.16. Parties and Successors Bound. This agreement shall be binding upon the heirs, 
executors, administrators and assigns of the parties hereto and constitutes the- entire agreement of the 
parties hereto, and may not be amended by the parties except in writing signed by the majority of the 
parties. 
12.17. Article Headings. The Article headings and numbers contained in this Operating 
Agreement have been inserted only as a matted of convenience and for reference, and in no way shall be 
construed to define, limit, or describe the scope otr intent of any provision of this Operating Agreement. 
12.18. Amendment. This Operating Agreement may be amended or revoked at any time by a 
written agreement executed by all of the parties to this Operating Agreement. except where a lesser" 
percentage of Membership Interests is pennitted elsewhere in this Operating Agreement. No change or 
modification to this Operating Agreement shall be valid unless in writing and signed by all of the parties 
to this Operating Agreement. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF. the parties have set their hands and se·als the date and year 
first above written. 
EQUITY PARTNERS, LLC 
By: (1/k~ 8#--07 
Its: iti ~ Member 
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~ DEFENDANT'S ~ EXHIBIT ! : 2:.-:-
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND RELEASE 
THIS SETTLENIBNT AGREEMENT AND RELEASE ("Settlement Agreement'') is made and 
entered into by and among Kerry Posey and Bobbie Posey, individuals (the "Poseys"); Equity Partners, 
LLC, a Utah limited liability company, and Four Winds Dev~lopment Group, LLC, a Utah limited 
liability company, as the sole member and manager of Equity Partners, LLC (collectively referred to as 
''Equity Partners"); Four Winds Development Group, LLC, a Utah limited liability company, James 
Didericksen,. as an individual and as a member and manager of Four Winds Development Group, LLC, 
Allan Bruun, as an individual and as a member and manager of Four Winds Development Group, LLC, 
and Guy Anderson, as an individual and as a member and manager of Four Wmds Development Group, 
LLC ( collectively referred to as ''Foor Winds"); and Tivoli Properties, LLC, a Utah limited liability 
company, Equity Partners, LLC, as a member of Tivoli Properties, LLC, Kerry Posey, as a member of 
Tivoli Properties, LLC, Bobbie Posey as a member of Tivoli Properties, LLC, and Vladamir Canro, as 
an individual and as the manager of Tivoli Properties, LLC {collectively referred to as "Tivolf'); and 
collectively referred to as the "Parties." 
RECITALS 
WHEREAS, up to the fall of 2007, the Poseys owned approximately thirty acres of real property 
located at 7916 North 10800 West,. Saratoga Springs, Utah, 84045, and more particularly described in 
the legal descriptions attached hereto as Exhibit A (the ''Property"); and 
WHEREAS, as members of a newly created Utah limited liability company (Tivoli Properties, 
LLC), the Poseys and Equity Partners entered into an agreement to develop the Property for the 
anticipated mutual benefit of the Poseys and Equity Partners; and 
WHEREAS, at a real estate closing held on or about November 16, 2007, in exchange for a cash 
payment and the agreement of Equity Partners to provide the Poseys with a third lien position in the 
Property, the Poseys conveyed title to the Property to Equity Partners, LLC; and 
WHEREAS, due to declining real estate and financial markets, and also due to growing distrust, 
dissatisfaction and disappointment between the Parties, the Parties have chosen now to part ways, and 
by this Settlement Agreement have arrived at what each believes to be an agreeable resolution and 
settlement of all claims, disputes and defenses the Parties have or may have with respect to each other. 
NOW TI:IEREFORE, in order to memorialize their resolution and settlement, the Parties hereby 
enter into this following Settlement Agreement upon the following terms: 
TERMS 
I. Settlement Payment: Equity Partners shall receive a lump sum Settlement Payment in the 
amount of Twenty Five Thousand dollars ($25,000.00). The Settlement Payment shall be made as a 
transfer from Premier Title Company's escrow account to an account, or accounts, designated by Equity 
Partners within forty-eight hours after the execution of this Settlement Agreement 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2. Transfer of Property: Equity Partners shall execute a Quit Claim Deed in favor of the Poseys, 
as Grantees, for the Property. The Quit Claim Deed descnlJed in this paragraph has been approved by 
the Poseys, and is currently being held by Premier Title Company. The Quit Claim Deed will be 
recorded by Premier Title Company within forty eight-hours after the execution of this Settlement 
Agreement. 
3. Release of Claims and Liability: The Parties mutually release, cancel, forgive and forever 
discharge each other, and each of their predecessors, parents, subsidiaries, affiliates and divisions, and 
all of their officers, members, directors and employees from all actions, claims, demands, damages, 
obligations, liabilities, controversies and executions, of any kind or nature whatsoever, whether known 
or unknown, which have arisen, or which may have arisen, or which may arise by reason of money 
receive~ management of funds, management actions or payments made, as designated and described in 
the Tivoli Properties, LLC, Operating Agreement and the Real Estate Purchase Agreement associated 
with the Property, as managers, buyers, sellers, consultants,.agents, employees, representatives, owners2 
members, affiliates, contractors, associates, or any other affiliated operative from the first day of the 
world, including this day and each day hereafter. This release of claims includes, but is not limited to, 
the payments to and receipts by the persons and entities identified on the schedule of Questioned 
Payments attached hereto as Exhibit B. 
4. Global /Comprehensive Release: The Parties specifically waive any claim or right to assert 
any cause of action or alleged case of action which has, through oversight or error, intentionally or 
unintentionally, and whether by mutual or unilateral mistake, been omitted from this Settlement 
Agreement 
5. Agreement to Execute Additional Documents to Carry Out Settlement: The Parties 
will execute any and all other documents as reasonably necessary to implement the terms and effecting 
the purposes of this Settlement Agreement. 
6. Payment of Attorneys' Fees and Costs: Each Party is responsible for bis/her/its own 
attorneys' fees and costs associated with resolution of the issues and 1ransactions to which this 
Settlement Agreement pertains, including but not limited to negotiating,. drafting and entering into this 
Settlement Agreement, and for any subsequent documents and actions necessary and appropriate for 
implementing the terms and effecting the purposes of this Settlement Agreement. 
7. Confidentiality. Except as necessary to the conduct or protection of their legitimate business 
interests or as may be required by operation of law or order of court, the Parties covenant to hold the 
terms, conditions and performance of this Settlement Agreement in confidence and to refrain from 
discussing their dispute or its resolution with other persons not a party to this Settlement Agreement, 
except as necessary or appropriate with their legal and financial professionals. 
8. No Actual or Implied Admission: This Settlement Agreement is not to be construed as an 
admission or aclmowledgment of any wrongdoing, fault or liability by any Party to any other Party, or to 
any third person or entity not party to this Settlement Agreement; and each Party hereby expressly 
denies any such wrongdoing, fault or liability. 
2 
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9. Severability: If any provision of this Settlement Agreement or the application thereof 
to any person, entity, or circumstance shall, for any reason and to any extent, be found invalid or 
unenforceable, neither the remainder of this Settlement Agreement nor the application of such provision 
to any other person, entity, or circumstance shall be affected thereby, but rather shall be enforced to the 
greatest extent possible. 
10. Default and Attorneys' Fees and Costs: In the event of breach or default hereunder, 
the prevailing p~ shall be entitled to recover from the other party all expenses, costs, and attomeys' 
fees incurred in connection with determining, protecting or enforcing their rights, including lay and 
expert witness fees, whether such expenses would be recoverable as costs and attorneys' fees in the 
original action or not 
11. Jurisdiction, Venue, and Governing Law: Jurisdiction and Venue shall exist only in 
the Fomth District Court, Utah County, State of Utah for any action in regard to this Settlement 
Agreement. This Settlement Agreement shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws 
of the State of Utah. · 
12. Entire A2reement: This Settlement Agreement sets forth the entire Settlement 
Agreement of the Parties in the settlement of their respective differences. No provision of this 
Settlement Agreement may be amended or any right hereto modified or waived except by a written 
agreement executed by the Parties. 
13. Cooperation in Drafting the Settlement Agreement: Each Party hereto bas 
cooperated in establishing the terms of this Settlement Agreement as well as drafting the recitals and 
terms of this Settlement Agreement. Therefore, if any construction or interpretation is to be made 
regarding this Settlement Agreement or any of its Recitals or Terms, the same shall not be 
presumptively construed against any Party. 
14. Countemarts: This Settlement Agreement may be executed in any number of 
counterparts, each of which when so executed shall be deemed to be an original, and all of which when 
taken together shall constitute one and the same document 
15. Successors and Assigns: This Settlement Agreement is binding upon the Parties, 
their heirs, executors, administrators, successors, and assigns, and will inure to the benefit of the 
Parties, their heirs, executors, administrators, successors, and assigns. 
16. Authority to Execute This Agreement Each Party to this Settlement Agreement 
hereby represents and warrants to each other Party that he/she/it has the authority and/or has been duly 
authorized to execute, be bound to, and deliver this Settlement Agreement. 
17. Acknowledgement: The Parties declare that each has read and understands this Settlement 
Agreement The Parties have executed this Settlement Agreement voluntarily and without being unduly 
pressured, under duress or influenced by any statement or representation made by any other Party or by 
any person acting on behalf of any other Party, including their counsel. In negotiating, drafting and 
3 
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entering into this Agreement, the Parties also acknowledge that they have either been represented, or 
have had an opportunity to be represented, by and/or consult with independent counsel of their own 
choosing. 
Dated: 1/1 I Jo B 
EQUITYPARTNERS,LLC 
A UTAH LTh11TED LIABILITY COlvlP ANY 
ging Member of Four Winds 
Development Group, LLC, its sole member 
and manager 
Dated: -~//_-_/ ___ /-_Q_& ___ _ 
Dated: ///11 /o 3 
-----.-.,-..........,1-----
FOUR WINDS DEVELOP:MENT GROUP, LLC 
A UTAH LilvilTED LIABILITY COlv.lP ANY 
By. n7' 
Guy Anderson 
Its: Managing Member 
Dated: / / /4 /ae:, 
J • 
FOUR WlNDS DEVELOPMENT GROUP, LLC FOUR WINDS DEVELOP:MENT GROUP, LLC 
A UTAH LOOTED LIABILITY COMPANY A UTAHLilvilTED LIABILITY CO:tviPANY 
By.~~ 
Allan Brunn 
Its: Managing Member 
Dated: // /4 /Je 
. ) 
TIVOLI PROPERTIES, LLC 
AUTAHLIMITEDLIAB COMPANY 
· g Member of Four Winds 
Development Group, LLC, the sole member 
and manager of Equity Partners, LLC, its 
member 
Dated: /I /, 2 /o<i' I I 
TIVOLI PROPERTIES, LLC 
A UTAH Lil\fiTED LIABILITY COlv.lPANY 
By. ~7- I~ Kerry t»osey 
Its: Member 
Second Signature Page of Settlement Agreement on Following Page 
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Second Signature Page of Settlement Agreement 
Dated: _ _._l ___ /-_/ ___ ~_-...;;.~-&7~---
TIVOLI PROPERTIES, LLC 
A UTAH LilvilTED LIABILITY COMPANY 
By:~filz~ Bobbie Posey 
Its: Member 
Dated: // - /;:) - I) ¥7 
By.~~ Kerry Po 
As an individual 
Dated: /M.e 
Dated: // /// /crlf' 
--............ ,"---'-.__._, --=--=----
By.~ 
Guy Anders ~--~ ..
As an individual 
Dated: //- / .1 - 0 8 
TIVOLIPROPERTIES,LLC 
A UTAH Lll\ITTED LIABILITY COMP ANY 
By: .,,,6CJ,e1 J'l} .JZ}J}. 
Vladamir Canro 
Its: Manager 




As an individual 
Dated: //-//- c8 
---------
By. fl/t ~ 
Allan Bruun 
As an individual 
Dated: If- )A - o ~ 
By: fl?~ '° J!:? ._O I 
VIaJmii'ii Canro 
As an individual 
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When Recorded Mail to: 
GR.ANTEE 
7'1 l lo NOrttl \ {)?DO we~+ 
~l\~a. rprm.~ c, or 'E'-f otfr; 
EMT 122137:2008 PG 1 of 2 
RANDALL A. COVINGTON UTAH COUNTY RECORDER 
200! Nov 14 12u FEE 14,00 BY TO 
mo&rnr~M RECORDam INSIJAAHCE AGE 
PREMJER TITLE INSURANCE AGENCY INC. 
7240 S Hlghmad Dr Ste 200 
Salt L11kc City, UT 84121 
QUIT CLAIM DEED 
Equity Partners LLC 
grantor(s) of Utah. State of UTAH. hereby QUIT CLAIM to 
Keay n. Posey and Bobbie M. Posey, Tenants in Common , gr:antee(s) 
of Utah for the sum of TEN DOLLARS AND onmR VALUABLE 
CONSIDERATIONS- the following described tract(s) of land in County, 
State of Utah, to-wit 
Pm=ll: . 
Commcnc:b,g 11.t11 point located Smfh 867.08 feet tmd 'EllSt 56.12 feet &am tho North 
qmzm:r mmer of Scclion 23, Townsbfp IJ South, 1tanp 1 West, Salt lab Dam mu!Mcridum; 
lbcaco Nmlh 89 cfcgcecs Bat sz•Eost ahm5~~tcnce lhus S9Z.2B f.cct;Samh as 
~ 57'1S7" Emt along im c:mtfag !=ce_li= 1SS.09 Em; dmM:c Soafh 191.BZ feet; 
lheileeSocdh 89 degrees 49'19•Westpartially along a fcnco Uno mid fmce lincmctensfatt 
1145.68 fc:at; du:ncc North 00 d.egrecs 05'i4• l!IISt along Elllltright cfwa:., lfno afBmwood 
Raad .201.24 feet to paint ot bcpnmDg. . . .. 
Tax Seda! No.: 68-05~29 
Pucd2: 
Cmmzu:ndng l!asta.hms Sc:ction line 60.69 !ed IIDdSouth 867.58 led fram. the North 
quorter caau:r of Sectian .ZS, Towmbip B Sol1fh, Jlmlgc 1 West,Salt IAke Base and Meridfan, 
th=m East ZSSS.OS &ct; lhau:oSculb 4Z ~ 41' West667.20 Ccetto a.lc:ncc; tiu:Dce 
Nmth 89 degrees4'7' West alonssald.£cnco llno.2404.BB !eetto alenCDm!crscclion; thence 
Nortb 26' East ahmg feum line 481.48 rcctto t1ui beginnfng. 
mui excbuHng tho followmg descrlbed fmct o!Jand In Utah Comity, Sblte o!Ulnh: 
Commmu:mg at II point lacatedSoufh 867 ..08 feet F.ast 56.12 fcetfram tho North qumfu 
ccmc:r of Sediml ZS, Township 6 South, Rap l West, Sall LIila, Daso and.Mcrfdilm; thaaco 
North 89 d,:p-ees 66'8Z• East AlcngDD Clistmg fimmllno S92.28lcet; tbenco South 89 
=grccs 67'67" Emt along 11D c:xhting!cnca lhus 7BS.D9 fed; thencaSomh 197.SZ feet; 
thence South 89 degm:s -'S'ls• West partially lllang a frnce lfnc muS fence line extension 
1 l4!J.68 led; lhi::nm North 00 dt;greea 06'14• East aJons East Right cl Wrr.y line cifBcdwuod 
ltDad 201.24- feet tu paint olbegumh,g. 
TaxSeml Na.: 58-055-0030 
Tax ID No.: 58-03S-001.9, SIJ.035-0030 
WITNESS the hnnd(s) of said granto~(s), November ...lL_, 2008. 
Signed In tlm Presence af 
-- -----------------------------
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This docwnent has been recorded electronfcally. 
Please see the attached copy to vtew the County 
Recorder's s1amp as It now appeara In the pnbllc record. 
I) 
When Recorded Mail to: 
GRANTEE 
Date: uh4\o& Enny: n.2.-\ ~7= yi,g 
Submitted by:~j::..e~.=:.~:..:lt,;.,__ __ _ 7q I to NDrt\1 \ ~oo \JJe,t 
~:!:°f rPflM C, UT ~'-{ 04c; 
Equity Partners LLC 
PREMIER TITLE INSURANCE AGENCY INC. 
7240 S Rigblcaud Dr Ste 200 
&II I.Ake City, UT 841ll 
QUIT CLAIM DEED 
grantor(s) of Utah, State of UfAH, hereby QUIT a.AIM to 
Kerry R. Posey and Bobbie M. Posey, Tenants in Common , gr:antee(s) 
of Utah for lhe sum of TEN DOLLARS AND OTHER VALUABLE 
CONSIDERATIONS- the following described tract(s) ofland in County, 
State of Utah, to-wit: 
Pa.reel t: . 
Commendns at a point Jocated Souib 867.08 feet and PAst 56.12 fed from the North 
qmm:rcanu:r olScdfon2S, Ttrwmbfp 9 South, Klmzc 1 W=,Slllt Lab Base msd Mcridiim; 
thence North 89 degrees 56' sz• East aJaq an~ fmlm Iino S9Z.ZS !e8t; Scmh 89 
degm:157'57" East n!ong an c:xlslin3fezu:cynli155,09 fed; thence South 197.GZ lect; 
thmco Sou1h 89 ~ 49'19" West partially along a &:nee Una and Cen=Uno emnsion 
114S.68 fed; theaa: North 00 cfep:cs 0&14• ED.st aJcmg East right alway line al Redwo0d 
Rmd 201.U fed: to point olbepmms-
Tm: Serial No.: 58-0S5--0029 
Pan:c12: 
Co%l1D1Cl1Cfns Eastaloog Section line 60.69 feet imd Soa1h 867.58 fc:ct Crom the North 
quarter comer of Scdion 25, Township S Sowls, Range 1 West, Salt Labs Biue mid Meridiim. 
thmco East 285S.OS fed; lhencaSouth "'2 degrees 41' West. 667.20 ht to a lcna:; thctco 
North 89 =si=s•7' West akmg mid fcnco line Z404.B5 li:d ID 11 fem:a intcnccticn; thmcc 
North 26 Eut along fence Unc 481.46 fa:t to the beginnfn& 
and c:xchuling tbe following dcsaibed trDct of Iimd In Ulnb Coa.nty, Sin.le cf Utuh: 
Commmcirtg at a point locmdSouth 867.08 feet Ell.St 56.12 feet from the North qwu1er 
comer of Sectia!I ZS, Township 5 South, K1mse 1 West, S41l I.aka BIUC 1111dMerldian; thence 
North 89 degrees 56'52" East along 11D c::dsting fence line S92.28 Ced; thence Scu1h 89 
dcgxces 57'57" East lllongan c::m1mg fcJu:c line 755.09 rcct; thencoSou.lb 197 .sz fed; 
thence South 89 degrees 49'19" West piartilllly l11cff3 11 f'encc liJlc 1111d fence lino c:xf.cnsion 
1145.68 feet; thc:ncc North 00 dcgrcc, 05'14• P.ut along EDst Right cf Wirf line of Redwood 
!toed 201..U feet la point ol beginning. 
Tu Serial No.: 58--0SS-OOSO 
Tax ID No.: 58--03>0029, 58-035--0030 
WITNESS the hand(s) of said grantor(s), November _lL__, 2008. 
Signed in the Presence of 
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STATE OF tITAH, ) 
).ss 
County of SALT LAKE ) 
E!qully Pllrlners LLC 
Dy: Allna Bn11s111 Mouagiag Member of Four 
Wh11h Development Group, Its Soh: Member sand 
M11nlleer 
_-,. # .,r-1 /fl/ /<, p,.. .l"'- /~.I ?c,L__ 
EqaJty PArtJlers LLC / 
By: Reuhl Gay Andersoa, Mmugua:Mcmheror 
Four Winds Development Group, Its Sole 
bcrlUld Dgtr 
ty Partners LLC 
James Darren Dlderiduea. MllllllJ:ml: 
mber ofFour Winds Development G roop, Its 
Sele Member llJld M1m1ccr 
On November L 2008, personally appeared before me, Allan Bruun, 
Reulon Guy Andemon, James J?arrell Dlderlclcsen, Managing Member of Four 
Wmds Development Group, Its Sole Member and Manager, Equity PmtDers LLC 
the signer(s) of the abow instrument. who duly acknowledged to me lhat they 
executed the same. ~
~· ~ 
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Commencing at a point located South 867.08 feet and East 56.12 feet from the North quarter 
comer of Section 23, Township 5 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence 
North 89 degrees 56' 32" East along an existing fence line 392.28 feet; South 89 degrees 57'57" 
East along an existing fence line 753.09 feet; thence South 197.62 feet; thence South 89 degrees 
49'19" West partially along a fence line and fence line extension 1145.68 feet; thence North 00 
degrees 05'14" East along East right of way line of Redwood Road 201.24 feet to point of 
beginning. 
Tax Serial No.: 58-035-0029 
Parcel 2: 
Commencing East along Section line 60.69 feet and South 867.58 feet from the.North quarter 
comer of S~ction 23, Township 5 South, Range I West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, thence 
East 2853 .03 feet; -thence South 42 degrees 41' West 667 .20 feet to a fence; thence North 89 
degrees 47' West along said fence line 2404.35 feet to a fence intersection; thence North 26' East 
along fence line 481.46 feet to the beginning, 
and excluding the following described tract of land in Utah County, State of Utah: 
Commencing at apoint located South 867.08 feet East 56.12 feet from the North quarter comer of 
Section 23, Township 5 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North 89 
degrees 56'3211 East along an existing fence line 392.28 feet; thence South 89 degrees 57'57" East 
along an existing fence line 7 53 .09 feet; thence South I 97 .62 feet; thence South 89 degrees 
49'19" West partially along a fence line and fence line extension 1145.68 feet; thence North 00 
degrees 05'14" East along East Right of Way line of Redwood Road 201.24 feet to point of 
beginning. 
Tax Serial No.: 58-035-0030 
Tax ·s~nal No.: ·58-035-0029 
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Related Entities 
Four Winds Development 
Granite Builders 
Geo systems 






















1004, 1008, 1021, 1024, 
1027, 1034, 1042, 1049, 
1055 
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